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THREE SYMMETRIES BETWEEN TEXTUALIST
AND PURPOSIVIST THEORIES OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION—AND
THE IRREDUCIBLE ROLES OF VALUES
AND JUDGMENT WITHIN BOTH
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.†
This Article illuminates an important, ongoing debate between
“textualist” and “purposivist” theories of statutory interpretation by identifying three separate stages of the interpretive process at which textualists, as
much as purposivists, need to make value judgments. The Article’s analysis,
which reveals previously unrecognized symmetries between the two theories, is
consistent with, but does not depend upon, empirical studies indicating that
judicial ideology matters more than methodology in determining interpretive
outcomes. It rejects the frequent claim of textualists that their theory much
more stringently restrains value-based decision making than does
purposivism.
Of the three interpretive stages at which textualists rely on value-based
judgments as much as purposivists do, one stands at the threshold when
“interpretive dissonance”—reflecting a partly value-based experience of discordance between what a statute at first blush seems to mean and an interpreter’s expectations concerning what well-written legislation would likely
direct—triggers an initial resort to interpretive theory. Then, symmetrically,
both textualists and purposivists need to specify the context within which a
statute should be interpreted. Although textualists emphasize a statute’s “semantic context” and purposivists its “policy context,” making specific determinations of what is contextually relevant and irrelevant frequently draws
values into play. Finally, after an interpretive context is specified, textualist
as much as purposivist interpreters must make judgments of “reasonableness.” Purposivists inquire what reasonable legislators would have intended. For textualists, the comparable question involves how a reasonable
person would understand statutory language in context. The construct of a
reasonable interpreter is inherently value laden.
Because both textualist and purposivist theories require partly
value-based decision making, there is no escaping the conclusion that good
judging requires good judgment—even when reasonable disagreement exists
† Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. I am
grateful to Glenn Cohen, Ryan Doerfler, Einer Elhauge, Vicki Jackson, Duncan Kennedy,
Dan Meltzer, Frank Michelman, Caleb Nelson, and Matthew Stephenson for insightful
comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks go to John Manning, without whose extensive comments, guidance, and support this Article never would have taken shape. Thanks,
too, to Charlie Griffin and Niko Bowie for outstanding research assistance.
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about what good judgment requires. Normative debates about theories of
statutory interpretation will remain incomplete until textualists, in particular, reckon adequately with this reality.
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INTRODUCTION
A central ambition of most theories of statutory interpretation1 is
to ensure that judges act as faithful agents of the legislature2—a role
that requires courts to subordinate their own values to those of their
principals. “Purposivist” theories demand that judges do so by deciding statutory cases in accordance with the purpose or intent of the legislature.3 “Textualist” theories agree, and sometimes affirm
1
For a brisk survey of the leading modern theories, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 622–26 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].
2
See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 120. But cf.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313 (1986) (characterizing the judicial “role as fundamentally the creative one of a partner continuing to develop, in what [the judge] believes is the
best way, the statutory scheme Congress began”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1482 (1987) (depicting judges as agents “who must
often update their orders to meet changing circumstances”).
3
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 266
(2002) (arguing that “purposive” interpretation “reminds the judge . . . that it is in
Congress, not the courts, where the Constitution places the authority to enact a statute”);
Peter L. Strauss, Essay, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 242, 252–53 (1998) (arguing that purposivism makes courts the most effective agents of the legislature). In using the term “purposivism” as I do, I link two approaches that sometimes have been separated by subsuming what might be called
“intentionalism” under the rubric of purposivism. As a conceptual matter, there is undoubtedly a clear difference between two varieties of statutory purpose: the specific intentions of the statute’s enacting legislature and the more “general aim or policy which
pervades a statute.” Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60
HARV. L. REV. 370, 370–71 (1947); see John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 677 & n.11 (1997) (discussing this distinction). For an approach centered on the former kind of purpose, or what might be labeled legislative
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even more ardently, that judges should strive to exclude their own
values from the interpretive process.4 According to textualists,
purpose-based inquiries invite courts to smuggle in their personal
preferences by imputing their views to the lawmaking authority.5 In
textualists’ estimation, courts best act as faithful agents by enforcing
the fair meaning of the words that the legislature enacted.6
Besides converging in their aspirations to make courts the faithful
agents of the legislature, modern or “new” textualists and purposivists
concur on another point of central importance: the meaning of the
words of a statute, as of other texts, depends on context.7 In so acknowledging, new textualists break with an older “plain meaning”
school, which maintained that the implications of statutory language
are often unmistakable to any competent speaker of English, with no
need for specialized knowledge about legal history or traditions.8
Nevertheless, as John Manning has emphasized, textualist and
purposivist theories postulate that different kinds of contexts ought to
“intent,” see Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“The judge should try to think his way as best he can
into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the
statute applied to the case at bar.”). For the classic statement of the latter, more general
approach, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374, 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (urging interpreters to “[d]ecide what purpose ought to be
attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved” on
the assumption that the legislature consisted of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable
purposes reasonably,” and to “[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in question
so as to carry out the purpose” as well as possible).
4
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 63 (1994) (arguing that judges “are supposed to be faithful
agents, not independent principals”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2001) (“The root of the textualist position is . . . in straightforward faithful agent theory.”).
5
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
3, 17–18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The practical threat is that, under the guise or even
the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in
fact pursue their own objectives and desires . . . .”).
6
See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419–20
(2005).
7
See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 73, 79–80 (2006) (discussing the importance of context for textualism and purposivism); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 16, 32–33 (2012).
8
See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2456 (2003)
[hereinafter Manning, Absurdity Doctrine] (“In contrast with their literalist predecessors in
the ‘plain meaning’ school, modern textualists reject the idea that interpretation can occur ‘within the four corners’ of a statute.” (quoting White v. United States, 191 U.S. 545,
551 (1903))); Manning, supra note 7, at 79 & n.28; Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction
and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 252 (“Plain meaning . . . is a blunt, frequently crude, and certainly narrowing device, cutting off access to
many features of some particular conversational or communicative or interpretive context
that would otherwise be available to the interpreter or conversational participant.”).
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matter.9 “Textualists,” he writes, “give primacy to” what he calls a statute’s “semantic context”10 or to those features of context that give rise
to what philosophers of language refer to as pragmatic meaning11—
“evidence about the way a reasonable person conversant with relevant
social and linguistic practices would have used the words.”12 By contrast, Manning emphasizes, “[p]urposivists give precedence to policy
context—evidence that goes to the way a reasonable person conversant with the circumstances underlying enactment [of a statute]
would suppress the mischief [at which the statute aims] and advance
the remedy.”13
In this Article I shall argue that textualists’ acknowledgment that
interpretation necessarily occurs in context generates an important
set of symmetries between textualist and purposivist theories that textualists, in particular, have frequently failed to recognize.14 At each of
three stages of an unfolding interpretive process, textualist and
purposivist interpreters both need to make value judgments of closely
parallel kinds, at least in some cases. As I shall discuss, a number of
empirical studies have found that judicial ideology matters more than
methodology in determining interpretive outcomes.15 This Article’s
noncynical analysis would help to explain, though it does not depend
on, those findings.
Of the three points at which both textualists and purposivists necessarily make value judgments, the first stands at the threshold of the
interpretive process. Many occasions for the application of theories of
statutory interpretation involve a phenomenon that I shall refer to as
“interpretive dissonance.”16 Interpretive dissonance arises from a felt
9

See Manning, supra note 7, at 90–91.
See id. at 91; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 16.
11
In standard usage within the philosophy of language, semantics is concerned with
the meaning of words and sentences in a language, without regard to complexities arising
from the context of their utterance. See PATRICK GRIFFITHS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 21 (2006) (“Semantics is the study of context-independent
knowledge that users of a language have of word and sentence meaning.”). Pragmatics, by
contrast, is concerned with the meaning of words and sentences in context. See id. at 153
(“Pragmatics is about the use of utterances in context, about how we manage to convey
more than is literally encoded by the semantics of sentences.”).
12
See Manning, supra note 7, at 91; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 16 (“In
their full context, words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they
were written . . . .”).
13
Manning, supra note 7, at 91.
14
For an important previous exploration of convergences between textualist and
purposivist theories, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 34–43 (2006).
15
See infra notes 204–10 and accompanying text.
16
There may be some similarities to the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance,
according to which “we have, built into the workings of our mind[s], a mechanism that
creates an uncomfortable feeling of dissonance, or lack of harmony, when we become aware
of some inconsistency among the various attitudes, beliefs, and items of knowledge that
10
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experience of discordance between what might be thought of as a statute’s first-blush meaning—what its words, construed relatively acontextually,17 would seem to require18—and an interpreter’s immediate,
equally provisional expectations concerning what well-written legislation by either an actual or a reasonable legislature would likely direct.19 Looking at what a statute at first blush seems to prescribe, the
interpreter responds by wondering whether the first-blush meaning is
correct.20
The resulting question requires precise statement. At issue is not
whether a purported interpreter should craft an exception to a

constitute our mental store.” PETER GRAY, PSYCHOLOGY 520 (4th ed. 2002). The theory
traces to LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3 (1957) (“The existence of
dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person [experiencing
it] to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.”). For overviews of research
on cognitive dissonance, see, for example, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL
THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999) (evaluating studies on cognitive dissonance in various settings); 1 DANIEL T. GILBERT ET AL., THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 335–37 (4th ed. 1998) (surveying studies on cognitive
dissonance).
17
Acontextuality could never be more than relative. Cf. Martha Minow & Elizabeth
V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1651 (1990) (“[T]he call to make judgments in context . . . seems misleading if it implies that we could ever make judgments
outside of a context; the question is always what context matters or what context should we
make matter for this moment.”).
18
An analogy involves what philosophers of language sometimes refer to as “default
meaning.” “[D]efault interpretation of the speaker’s utterance is normally understood to
mean salient meaning intended by the speaker, or presumed by the addressee to have
been intended, and recovered (a) without the help of inference from the speaker’s intentions or (b) without conscious inferential process altogether.” Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt, Defaults in Semantics and Pragmatics, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/defaultssemantics-pragmatics. But the literature contains “no one, unique ‘default model’ of utterance interpretation.” Id.
19
See Marcelo Dascal & Jerzy Wroblewski, Transparency and Doubt: Understanding and
Interpretation in Pragmatics and in Law, 7 LAW & PHIL. 203, 220 (1988) (“A legal text which
formulates legal rules is always understood in the context of the legal system to which these
rules belong. It is usually assumed that such system has—or should have—the properties
of consistency, coherence and eventually completeness and lack of redundancy. Whenever
the direct reading of a legal text does not conform to such assumed properties, one can say
that the systemic context generates a doubt that prompts a search for a more appropriate
interpretation.”); cf. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 350–54 (arguing that an interpreter’s values
frequently play a role in determinations of whether a statute is ambiguous, vague, or unclear); Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1483 (observing that “an apparently clear text can be
rendered ambiguous by . . . highly unreasonable consequences”).
20
Generally, to resolve cognitive dissonance, a person will either alter one or more of
her beliefs so that they become consonant with one another, alter her belief to accord with
her behavior, or alter her behavior to conform to her beliefs. See FESTINGER, supra note 16,
at 6; GILBERT ET AL., supra note 16, at 336 (“The most obvious solution to dissonance is to
engage in cognitive work to modify one of the dissonant elements (i.e., self-generated attitude change).”).
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statute’s plain meaning after having identified it,21 perhaps on the assumption that the statute, if accorded its actual meaning, would produce an absurd result.22 The question instead is whether someone’s
initial, provisional, and possibly unthinking assumption about a statute’s meaning or implication was in fact correct when the statute’s
words are seen in context. Two examples will illustrate the kind of
response that I associate with interpretive dissonance. One, which is
notorious in the literature on statutory interpretation, may encourage
the view that interpretive dissonance—however real as a psychological
phenomenon—could and should be accorded no significance in the
application of faithful agent, and especially textualist, theories of statutory interpretation. But I expect the second to pull instincts to the
more accurate, nearly opposite view.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 23 famously held that the
Alien Contract Labor Act, which made it unlawful to assist the immigration of an alien under contract to perform “labor or service of any
kind,”24 did not apply to the efforts of Holy Trinity Church to engage
a foreign clergyman as its minister. The face of the statute contained
no obvious ambiguity or vagueness.25 Read without further information about the background against which Congress had acted or its
likely values and purposes, the law would have covered a contract for
the services provided by a clergyman.26 But that first-blush interpretation provoked interpretive dissonance: the Supreme Court found it
inconceivable that reasonable legislators could have meant to interfere with a religious congregation’s choice of its minister.27 Interpretive dissonance thus marked the first stage of an interpretive process
resulting in the conclusion that the Alien Contract Labor Act did not
apply. Textualists routinely denounce Holy Trinity.28
21
As Professor Molot notes, “textualist scholars often criticize purposivists for employing context in order to adjust or even contradict a statute’s clear textual meaning.” Molot,
supra note 14, at 37.
22
Cf. Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2471 (“The absurdity doctrine
comes into play only after a court provisionally identifies the statute’s clear social meaning . . . .”). To refuse to enforce a statute’s actual meaning on the grounds that doing so
would produce an absurd result is not so much to interpret as to revise.
23
143 U.S. 457 (1892).
24
Id. at 458.
25
See Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2424 (describing the Alien Contract
Labor Act as being of “unforgiving breadth”).
26
See Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458 (“It must be conceded that the act of the [church]
is within the letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service,
and implies labor on the one side with compensation on the other.”).
27
See id. at 459 (“[W]e cannot think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a
transaction like that in the present case.”).
28
See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 116 (2007)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (derisively describing the majority opinion as adopting the approach
of “that miraculous redeemer of lost causes, Church of the Holy Trinity”); SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 7, at 11–13, 222–23 (scorning Holy Trinity); SCALIA, supra note 5, at 18
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The second example of a resort to interpretive theory triggered
by interpretive dissonance, which has received less discussion in the
literature on statutory interpretation but possesses greater contemporary importance, comes from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Reconstruction-era
statute that creates a cause of action against state officials who violate
federal rights.29 Read literally, § 1983 makes no exception for suits
seeking to enjoin state tax collection on the ground that a tax violates
the Constitution. Nor would it leave room for the application of traditional doctrines of official immunity30 that bar suits for damages
against judges and prosecutors acting in those capacities and that also
preclude recovery of money from most other state officials unless they
violated “clearly established” federal rights.31
Nevertheless, a § 1983 suit to enjoin state tax collection produced
evident interpretive dissonance among the Justices in National Private
Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission32 that ultimately led to
the recognition of an implied statutory exception. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, a recognized textualist,33 began by noting that the Court has “long recognized that principles of
(characterizing Holy Trinity as “the prototypical case involving the triumph of supposed
‘legislative intent’ (a handy cover for judicial intent) over the text of the law”); ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 93–102 (2006) (arguing that the Court erred in both the framing and the execution
of its inquiry).
29
The text of § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
Section 1983 has not been wholly ignored in the literature on statutory interpretation.
See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1484–88. For discussions of interpretive methodology
focused specifically on § 1983, see generally Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal
Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1985) (discussing the proper scope of federal protection of individual rights under
§ 1983); Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982) (discussing the Court’s contributions to current confusion in
interpreting § 1983); Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old
Light on Section 1983, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 604–11 (1985) (discussing how federal courts
have sketched out the details of § 1983).
30
See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 492 (observing that “the statute affords no exceptions for special classes of persons”).
31
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Although Harlow was a case
involving the immunities of federal officials sued directly under the Constitution in Bivens
actions, see id. at 805, the Court, in crafting immunity rules for Bivens actions, announced
that it would apply the same immunity standards in suits against state officials under
§ 1983, see id. at 818 n.30.
32
515 U.S. 582 (1995).
33
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2029 (2006); Manning, supra note 2, at 114 & n.7.
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federalism and comity generally counsel that courts should adopt a
hands-off approach with respect to state tax administration” and that
“[s]ince the passage of § 1983, Congress and this Court repeatedly
have shown an aversion to federal interference with state tax administration.”34 The Court responded similarly in Tenney v. Brandhove, a
§ 1983 case in which the plaintiffs sought damages from state legislators who had allegedly violated the Constitution in their legislative capacities.35 In effect explaining the basis for its interpretive
dissonance, the Court began with a recitation of the long American
tradition of protecting “speech and action in the legislature” and the
policy reasons that support legislative immunity.36 Responding to the
interpretive dissonance that thus arose, Justice Felix Frankfurter,
speaking for the Court, concluded that “[w]e cannot believe that
Congress—itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom—would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert
inclusion in the general language before us.”37 Justice Hugo Black,
who is often labeled as a textualist,38 concurred in the result.39
In identifying and explicating the role of interpretive dissonance
in furnishing occasions for applications of theories of statutory interpretation, by purposivists and textualists alike, I shall argue that such
experiences are frequently value driven, sometimes in a controversial,
ideologically charged sense. In an important range of cases, different
interpreters either will or will not experience interpretive dissonance,
or will experience it in different degrees, due to differences in their
values,40 regardless of whether they are textualists or purposivists.
Sometimes an interpreter’s values will be engaged directly. At a minimum, an interpreter’s values will play a role in his or her ascription of
reasonable values to the legislature for purposes of assessing what the
legislature plausibly could have meant to direct.
Although my claim that an interpreter’s values will prove relevant
at this threshold step might appear to represent a banal restatement
34

Nat’l Private Truck Council, 515 U.S. at 586.
341 U.S. 367, 369 (1951).
36
Id. at 372–73.
37
Id. at 376.
38
See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices
Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 26 (1994) (noting the “intense and persistent proclamations of fidelity to the constitutional text” of Justices Black and Scalia).
39
See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379 (Black, J., concurring) (invoking “the long-standing and
wise tradition that legislators are immune from legal responsibility for their intra-legislative
statements and activities”). According to David Achtenberg, the legislative history of
§ 1983 is consistent with the recognition of legislative immunity, though of a narrower
scope than the immunity that exists under modern doctrine. See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW.
U. L. REV. 497, 502–11 (1992).
40
Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 354 (noting that people with different values will
sometimes differ in their judgments of whether a statute is unclear).
35
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of a familiar realist insight, more is at stake. When faithful agent
theories emphasize that interpretation must occur in context, ideologically inflected judgments that language may not mean what at first
blush it might appear to mean cannot be labeled categorically as regrettable seepages of an interpreter’s values into a process that ideally
would be value neutral. Instead, I shall argue, the role of values is
irreducible in triggering apprehensions that statutory language really
may not mean what at first blush it might appear to mean—as any
theory that insists that interpretation necessarily occurs in context
must acknowledge, even if textualists have often refused to do so.41
The second underappreciated role that interpreters’ values inevitably play in both textualist and purposivist theories of statutory interpretation emerges in the process through which uncertainties,
including those created by interpretive dissonance, are resolved. With
all agreeing that interpretation must occur in context, and with
Professor Manning’s distinction between semantic contexts and policy
contexts having achieved broad acceptance,42 another, less frequently
noted aspect of the debate about appropriate interpretive contexts
has largely escaped attention: both semantic and policy contexts can
be defined either relatively broadly or relatively narrowly.43 Viewed in
a narrow semantic context defined mostly by dictionaries and grammar books, the statute involved in Holy Trinity would have brooked no
41

See Molot, supra note 14, at 37 (citing textualist sources).
The vocabulary may have some tendency to confuse. Although textualists say that
they are concerned with semantic context, what they seek to ascertain is not limited to a
legal text’s “semantic meaning” insofar as the semantic content of an expression “is fully
determined by the lexical meaning of the words used and the syntactical structure of the
sentence.” Andrei Marmor, Textualism in Context 6 (U.S.C. Gould Sch. of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-13, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112384. Rather, textualists seek to identify a legal text’s pragmatic or contextual, rather than its purely semantic, meaning. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Marmor, supra, at 7 (“[T]here are many cases in which the
speaker asserts something different from the semantic content of the expression used
(e.g., a doctor in the emergency room telling a patient with a gunshot wound, ‘Don’t
worry, you are not going to die.’ The doctor is not promising the patient eternal life; she is
just saying that this particular wound is not life-threatening).”).
43
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention Is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on the Distinction
Between “Legitimate” and “Illegitimate” Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Lawmaking, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 847, 878–79 (2013); cf. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1830 (1991) (“Nothing about the necessary contexts that provide the basis for interpretation can tell one how far one should go in
getting information about that context.”). Issues arising from the need to frame the context within which statutory interpretation properly occurs may exemplify the more
profound claim that in continuous relationships played out over time, such as those involving the government and its citizens or Congress and the courts, “constitutional law has no
criteria for isolating transactions from . . . background relationship[s]” and that the “framing” of transactions or contexts for analysis is therefore frequently outcome determinative
in legal controversies. Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111
YALE L.J. 1311, 1313 (2002).
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ministerial exception,44 nor would the language of § 1983 have
excluded suits to enjoin state tax collection or actions to recover damages from state legislators. Nor could such exceptions plausibly have
emerged if the statutes were viewed in a narrow policy context, characterized by a rough-and-ready identification of the primary problem
that the legislature sought to address, without attention to other,
leavening concerns that reasonable legislators likely would also have
had. In order to reach the conclusions that it did, the Supreme Court
needed to broaden the interpretive context—as I shall explain more
fully below—to include a richer informational background including
historic patterns of respect for religious autonomy, federal noninterference with state taxes, and recognition of official immunity. Only in
light of that expanded background did it become plausible to conclude that reasonable legislators would have wanted exceptions to the
statutes’ literal language and that reasonable interpreters should construe the statutes as including exceptions.
If both textualists and purposivists need to specify the breadth of
the context within which statutes should be interpreted, and if the
judgments as to appropriate breadth will sometimes determine the
outcome of cases, then issues bearing on the specification of semantic
and policy contexts assume vital importance.45 As I shall explain, the
specification of the appropriate semantic or policy context for interpreting statutes is often driven, and indeed inevitably so, by partly
value-based judgments. In the case of § 1983, for example, the broadening of the interpretive context to recognize that Congress legislated
against a background in which officials sued at common law sometimes enjoyed immunity defenses was almost certainly influenced by
recognition that such defenses serve important policy goals.46
44

See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
See Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1923
(2006) (characterizing the absence of a principled method for distinguishing relevant
from irrelevant aspects of background knowledge as “the missing step of textualism”);
Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023,
1029–32 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of the question of what constitutes relevant
context for administrative law adjudication and calling attention to background
principles).
46
Judge Learned Hand gave a classic explanation often quoted by the Supreme
Court:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal
motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for
the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine
such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The
justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is
well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials,
the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
45
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Again, I want to emphasize, my argument is not that textualists
are unfaithful to their own theories whenever they allow their views
about sound policy to influence their judgments about the appropriate breadth of an interpretive context. There is, and could be, no
purely non-normative criterion precisely marking what should be
deemed relevant or irrelevant.
The third occasion for judges’ values to affect their interpretive
decisions then comes to the fore. Having specified the appropriate
interpretive context, both purposivists and textualists must make determinations of “reasonableness.” Purposivists inquire what reasonable legislators would have intended.47 For textualists, the comparable
question involves how a reasonable person would understand statutory language within an interpretive context that makes it plausible to
think that that language should not be given its relatively acontextual
semantic meaning.48 As I shall explain, the reasonable interpreter is a
construct,49 and it cannot be a value-free construct. As the philosopher Donald Davidson put it, “when anyone, scientist or layman, ascribes thoughts to others, he necessarily employs his own norms in
making the ascriptions.”50 Under these circumstances, I shall argue, a
hypothetical reasonable person’s determination about how a statute
that occasions interpretive dissonance ought to be interpreted will inevitably reflect judgments about what would be morally, politically,
and practically provident or improvident.
duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn
out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later
find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must
indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their
duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been
honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As
is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the
evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in
the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation. Judged as res nova, we should not hesitate to follow the path
laid down in the books.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
47
See, e.g., Manning, supra note 7, at 102 (“In brief, Legal Process-style purposivism
rests on the assumption that interpretation should proceed as if a reasonable person were
framing coherent legislative policy.”).
48
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (“We should look at the statutory structure and hear
the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of
words.”); Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2392–93 (“[Textualism] ask[s] how a
reasonable person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would
read the text in context.”).
49
See Manning, supra note 7, at 83 (acknowledging that the “reasonable” reader
whose understanding of a statute is the touchstone of textualism is a hypothetical, “idealized” construct).
50
DONALD DAVIDSON, Representation and Interpretation, in PROBLEMS OF RATIONALITY 87,
97 (2004).

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt

696

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

2-MAY-14

9:01

[Vol. 99:685

In arguing that values affect the application of both textualist and
purposivist theories of statutory interpretation in ways that
participants in debates about those theories—and especially textualists—have often failed to grasp, my purposes are neither cynical nor
debunking. Throughout, I assume that the choice of either a textualist or a purposivist theory can have consequences.51 Yet I do not seek
to defend one in preference to the other,52 even though I argue that
textualism lacks some of the comparative, value-excluding advantages
that its proponents have sometimes claimed for it. The sole aspiration
of this Article is to promote an enriched understanding of how the
parallel structures of textualism and purposivism result in symmetrical
roles for value judgments in the application of the two theories.
The remainder of this Article develops as follows. Part I discusses
the circumstances that provoke appeals to theories of statutory interpretation and gives a fuller exposition of the role of interpretive dissonance as a triggering phenomenon. Part II, which forms the Article’s
heart, describes the basic tenets of textualist and purposivist theories
of statutory interpretation, explains the significance that they respectively assign to statutes’ interpretive context, and discusses how both
theories require judgments of “reasonableness.” Part II also demonstrates that the breadth with which the relevant interpretive context is
specified—the semantic context for textualists and the policy context
for purposivists—in conjunction with value-laden judgments of reasonableness, will often prove decisive in determining a statute’s meaning. Part III seeks to avoid misunderstanding by clarifying some
limitations on the relatively bold theses that Parts I and II advance. It
also anticipates and rebuffs the objection that the judicial opinions on
which I rely in revealing the necessary role of value judgments within
51
Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1768 (2010) (conceding that
“one cannot prove that methodology dictates outcomes in cases” but emphasizing that “it
surely affects opinion writing”). But cf. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 58–60 (2005) (concluding that Justices’ reliance on either substantive or language canons of construction is
driven by ideology, not methodology); Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1991–95 (2007) (finding that convergence
upon textualist and purposivist methodologies does not produce consensus among the
Justices with respect to results).
52
I also make no effort to compare the relative merits of either textualism or purposivism with theories that call for statutory interpreters to play roles other than that of a
faithful agent of the enacting legislature. In the domain of constitutional interpretation, I
have elsewhere defended an approach in which precedent, among other factors, sometimes calls for interpretive conclusions other than those that a faithful agent of the framers
and ratifiers of relevant constitutional provisions might have reached. See RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 111–26 (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1107, 1116 (2008) (arguing that overturning some settled but mistaken precedents “would
exceed [the Court’s] lawful authority”).
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textualist as well as purposivist theories represent betrayals, rather
than applications, of textualist principles.
I
THE OCCASIONS

OF

INTERPRETATION

The term “interpretation” can be used in either of two senses. In
the more capacious, “every application of a rule is also an interpretation,”53 as is every successful grasping of the meaning of another’s
words.54 But this is seldom the sense in which the word “interpretation” figures in legal debates.
In legal discourse, the term “interpretation” typically refers to a
reflective, problem-solving process triggered by an uncertainty or puzzle.55 Most of the time, we understand perfectly well what laws mean,
or how they apply to particular facts, without need for what we would
normally think of as interpretation56 and certainly without applying a
prescriptive theory such as textualism or purposivism. Someone who
drives through a stop sign cannot ordinarily present a recognizable
question of interpretation by saying that she had not interpreted the
stop sign to mean “stop.” Similarly, if a statute imposes a tax of 15%,
there will ordinarily be no interpretive question of whether it might
mean 10%. We need prescriptive theories of interpretation, and debate them, only as means of resolving uncertainties in our typically
un-self-conscious, largely atheoretical efforts to achieve linguistic understanding. (Indeed, if we needed a prescriptive theory of interpretation to know that a stop sign meant stop, we would presumably
also need a prescriptive theory of interpretation to interpret that
first-order theory of interpretation, and it would be, so to speak, “prescriptive theories of interpretation all the way down” in an endless
regress.57)
Recognizing that we need prescriptive theories of statutory interpretation only when our ordinary, typically un-self-conscious means of
53
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 207 (1991).
54
See, e.g., DONALD DAVIDSON, Radical Interpretation, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 125, 125 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter DAVIDSON, Radical Interpretation] (“All
understanding of the speech of another involves radical interpretation.”); DONALD
DAVIDSON, Belief and the Basis of Meaning, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION,
supra, at 141, 141 (“We interpret a bit of linguistic behaviour when we say what a speaker’s
words mean on an occasion of use.”).
55
See SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 207 (recognizing that “we ordinarily do not think” of
most applications as interpretations “for there is a sense in which to interpret a text or a
rule is to deal with a quandary”).
56
See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 86–88 (1996) (criticizing Dworkin as making “far too much of the work of interpretation”).
57
See RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 131 (1983); PATTERSON, supra note 56, at
88; Charny, supra note 43, at 1819.
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understanding leave us uncertain or puzzled,58 I would distinguish
three characteristic, but partly overlapping and not necessarily exclusive, occasions for resort to such theories.59 The first involves ambiguity. Ambiguity exists when language might have either of two
relatively clearly specifiable meanings, but we are unsure which applies.60 For example, does a regulation of “banks” refer to property
that abuts rivers or to financial institutions?61
A second type of occasion for puzzlement involves vagueness.
Many terms or linguistic usages include a fringe of uncertain applications.62 A well-worn example involves an ordinance dictating “no vehicles in the park.”63 Although it plainly applies to cars and trucks,
doubt may arise about whether it encompasses baby carriages or
bicycles.
A third kind of trigger for appeals to theories of statutory interpretation involves what I have called interpretive dissonance between
first-blush statutory meaning and implicit assumptions about what the
legislature would have wished to achieve. Frequently, a sense of interpretive dissonance may arise relatively directly from a judge’s own
convictions if a first-blush meaning yields what she would regard as a
troubling outcome and if she assumes that she and the legislature
have a significant core of shared values. In some cases, of course, a
judge might recognize a sharp divergence on some issues between her
58
As Duncan Kennedy emphasizes, there may be occasions on which a sense of uncertainty or puzzlement emerges from a prior, instrumentally or ideologically motivated
effort to discover vagueness or ambiguity that a first-blush meaning would not otherwise
have displayed. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 547–48 (1986). It is, for example, a familiar role of
lawyers to attempt to generate doubts where judges would not otherwise have felt them.
Professor Kennedy points out that judges, spurred by ideological commitment, might assume a similar role. See id.
59
For a similar categorization, see DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 351.
60
As so defined, ambiguity is different from, and does not subsume all cases of,
vagueness. See Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 128, 129 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan eds.,
2012) (“Ambiguous expressions have multiple meanings, as in the case of the homonym
‘bank’ which can mean both ‘river bank’ and ‘commercial bank.’ . . . In contrast,
an expression is vague if it has borderline cases.”); Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 97–98 (2010) (“In the technical sense, ambiguity refers to the multiplicity of sense: a term is ambiguous if it has more
than one sense. . . . The technical sense of vagueness refers to the existence of borderline
cases: a term is vague if there are cases where the term might or might not apply.”).
61
See Manning, supra note 2, at 171; Poscher, supra note 60, at 129.
62
See TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 9 (2000) (describing a law as
“vague if the boundaries of the area affected by [it] are unclear”); see also H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (3d ed. 2012) (“There will indeed be plain cases . . . to which general
expressions are clearly applicable . . . but there will also be cases where it is not clear
whether they apply or not.”).
63
This much-discussed example apparently originated with H.L.A. Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). For more recent
discussion, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 36–39.
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moral and policy views and those of the legislature. If so, she might
experience no jolt of surprise at the appearance that the legislature
had directed an outcome that she finds repugnant. Yet even an
alienated judge will experience some first-blush meanings that seem
to her to prescribe unreasonable results as a trigger for further interpretive inquiry.
Like the cases that I discussed in the Introduction, many of the
most controversial cases in the literature on statutory interpretation
involve readily identifiable interpretive dissonance. This is true, for
example, of Riggs v. Palmer, in which the court held that a grandson
who had murdered his grandfather64 should not receive the grandfather’s estate under a statute prescribing inheritance in accordance
with formally valid wills.65 Interpretive dissonance also provoked an
interpretive analysis—though one that ultimately resulted in the statute’s literal, exceptionless application—in a case involving the habitat
of the endangered snail darter, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.66
There, though the jarring implications led to a showdown about statutory interpretation methodology, a majority of the Justices held that a
statute barring government funding of projects that threatened endangered species barred the completion of a large and important
dam.67
What deserves emphasis, however, is that interpretive dissonance
plays a central role in many cases that have excited little controversy.
As I have noted, the Supreme Court agreed unanimously that § 1983
includes an unwritten exception for suits to enjoin state tax collection,68 and its initial decision to uphold an immunity defense in
§ 1983 cases came by 8–1.69 Many cases that courts resolve by applying well-accepted canons of statutory interpretation—including those
establishing presumptions that criminal statutes should not be read to
impose liability for serious offenses in the absence of mens rea70 and
that limitations periods are “subject to ‘equitable tolling’”71—exhibit a
similar logic. Any first-blush appearance that the legislature had imposed criminal liability in the absence of mens rea, particularly with
regard to a serious offense, or established a statute of limitations that
64

22 N.E. 188, 189 (N.Y. 1889).
Id. at 191.
66
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
67
See id. at 172.
68
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
69
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
70
See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
7, at 303.
71
Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).
65
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countenanced no equitable exceptions, would provoke surprise and
thus interpretive uncertainty.
That experiences of interpretive dissonance number among the
occasions for the application of interpretive theory should elicit no
resistance. Legal interpretation almost necessarily reflects an
assumption similar to what philosophers have labeled the “principle
of charity,”72 which “says that, other things being equal, we ought to
interpret a person as having reasonable beliefs.”73 In encountering
utterances in nearly all linguistic contexts, we characteristically proceed on the basis of assumptions about the intelligence, good faith,
and likely interests, values, and concerns of the speaker.74 Without
such assumptions, some of which involve the ascription of values, we
could not communicate with each other nearly as effectively as we do.
Although legislatures are of course multimember bodies, lacking the
mental attributes and preferences of natural persons, textualists as
well as purposivists postulate that legislation is the coherent expression of a rational lawmaker and reflects what some textualists describe
as an “objective” or “objectified” even if not a subjective legislative intent.75 As Professor Manning puts it, “textualists have sought to devise
a constructive intent that satisfies the minimum conditions for meaningfully tracing statutory meaning to the legislative process.”76
When statutory language’s first-blush meaning appears discordant with what we would expect reasonable legislators to have directed, or what we would expect the law to prescribe in light of
culturally based understandings and what we take to be widely shared
72

Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 19, at 205.
Christopher Gauker, The Principle of Charity, 69 SYNTHESE 1, 1 (1986). For two influential and heavily cited works on the principle of charity, see DAVIDSON, Radical Interpretation, supra note 54, at 136–37; WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 59 & n.2
(1960).
74
In a particularly well-known example, H.P. Grice identifies a number of normative
“maxims” that are conventionally at work in human conversation and that function to facilitate cooperation in the communication of thought and information, including “[m]ake
your contribution as informative as is required,” “[t]ry to make your contribution one that
is true,” “[b]e relevant,” and “[a]void obscurity of expression.” PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE
WAY OF WORDS 26–28 (1989). According to Grice, we normally trust others to observe
these maxims and feel entitled to draw inferences about the meaning of their utterances in
reliance on them. See id. For the argument that Grice’s theory functions better as a theory
of communication than as a theory of meaning, see Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99
YALE L.J. 945, 965 & n.52 (1990) (“Contrary to what Grice contended, we must look to the
conventions which govern the meaning of sentences to determine what a speaker means
rather than look to what the speaker means to determine what his or her sentences
mean.”).
75
See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17 (“We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus juris.”); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347,
353–57 (2005) (discussing textualists’ search for statutes’ “objectified intent”).
76
Manning, supra note 6, at 423.

R

73

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 17

TEXTUALIST AND PURPOSIVIST THEORIES

2-MAY-14

9:01

701

values, the deepest implicit assumptions underlying linguistic communication—which involve “the attribution of massive agreement”77
about many matters of fact and value—thus cause mental alarm bells
to sound.78 As noted above, the result will prove uncontroversial in
many cases. For example, nearly every informed observer might register surprise at any first-blush appearance that Congress had enacted a
statute that purported to regulate the conduct of non-Americans
outside the United States,79 notwithstanding language that included
no explicit limitations. Even in uncontroversial cases, however, an interpreter’s values inescapably play a role in the ascription of assumptions or purposes or an objective intent to Congress. All else equal,
the principle of charity calls for ascribing reasonable beliefs, purposes,
or intents;80 and the idea of reasonableness, as I shall explain shortly,
has an irreducibly normative aspect.81
If it should not be controversial that experiences of interpretive
dissonance will occasion interpretive inquiries into possible disparities
between statutes’ first-blush and actual meanings, neither should it be
surprising that people with different ideological views will sometimes
experience different first-blush interpretations as jarring. For example, conservatives maintain that first-blush interpretations that would
strip the states of their sovereign immunity from suit or alter traditional patterns of state-federal relations require further interpretive
examination within a broader interpretive context than that supplied
by dictionaries, grammar books, and otherwise bare statutory
language.82 Reflecting their somewhat different ideological
77
Jonathan E. Adler, Charity, Interpretation, Fallacy, 29 PHIL. & RHETORIC 329, 330
(1996). Adler not only ascribes this view to Davidson but also ultimately defends it.
78
See Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 19, at 205 (“The meaning of a legal text is
usually described as the will . . . of the historical law-maker. Therefore, the search for the
meaning in question ought to use all means relevant for reconstructing that will. On this
view, however, the law-maker is not only the alleged historical agent, but also a normative
construct, for he is endowed with the properties of a ‘rational agent.’ This means that the
interpretation must follow a ‘principle of charity[,]’ i.e., it must ascribe to the text that
meaning that maximizes its ‘rationality.’” (citation omitted)).
79
See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998) (citing United States v.
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818)) (invoking interpretive presumption that statutes do not apply extraterritorially); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 268–72 (describing
and defending an interpretive canon presuming that statutes do not apply
extraterritorially).
80
See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
81
See infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
82
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1996) (quoting
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991)) (stating that, as a result of
“the important role played by the Eleventh Amendment and the broader principles that it
reflects,” a congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity “must be obvious
from ‘a clear legislative statement’”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)) (relying on a presumption that “if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States
and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the
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predispositions, liberals are more likely to see the need for a broadergauged interpretive process when first-blush interpretations would
strip federal jurisdiction over suits alleging constitutional violations83
or classify affirmative action as a forbidden species of race discrimination.84 In Brown v. Plata,85 Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas concluded in dissent that an interpretation of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act that authorized a lower court to mandate the
release of 46,000 state prisoners if the state did not end unconstitutional prison overcrowding entailed such “absurd” consequences that
the Court should “bend every effort to read the law in such a way as to
avoid that outrageous result.”86 Given the indignities to which prisoners were subjected, the majority opinion written by Justice Anthony
Kennedy and joined by four more liberal Justices saw no absurdity
whatsoever.87
My point, I emphasize, is analytical, not critical. It arises not from
any feature peculiar either to textualism or purposivism, which might
be derided or embraced, but from a characteristic way in which language functions as a mechanism of human communication and in
law. Indeed, I do not mean to characterize interpretive dissonance as
a constitutive element of either textualism or purposivism. Rather, it
is a phenomenon intrinsic to human psychology and linguistic communication that forms part of the context within which textualism
and purposivism both operate. To put the point slightly differently,
every prescriptive theory of statutory interpretation presupposes the
existence of a triggering mechanism or mechanisms even if it does not
supply one. And interpretive dissonance is one such mechanism.
Against this claim, it does not suffice to assert—as textualists sometimes do—that judges should never appeal to context to contradict a

language of the statute” in concluding that a federal statute barring age discrimination by
employers, including States, did not apply to state judges (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
83
See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (demanding a “heightened showing” of congressional intent to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims in light of
the “serious constitutional question” that a denial of review would raise).
84
See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200–08 (1979) (holding that a provision of Title VII making racial discrimination unlawful did not forbid private affirmative action plans because the “background of the legislative history of Title VII
and the historical context from which the Act arose” revealed an intent to benefit historically disadvantaged groups).
85
131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
86
Id. at 1950–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia acknowledged that his preferred interpretation “would severely limit the circumstances under which a court could
issue structural injunctions to remedy allegedly unconstitutional prison conditions, although it would not eliminate them entirely.” Id. at 1958.
87
See id. at 1947 (describing the result as constitutionally and statutorily mandated
under the circumstances).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 19

TEXTUALIST AND PURPOSIVIST THEORIES

2-MAY-14

9:01

703

plain text.88 Once again, interpretive dissonance occasions a consideration of context to determine whether a text really does plainly
mean what at first blush it appears to mean.

TEXTUALISM

AND
AND

II
PURPOSIVISM: DEFINITIONS
COMPARISONS

Over the past twenty-five years, scholars have labored to distinguish purpose-based and text-based theories of statutory interpretation.89 As the Introduction emphasized, however, modern textualists
concur with purposivists in assigning a crucial role to the context in
which the legislature enacted a statute.90 This agreement highlights
the common challenge that textualists and purposivists face in needing to specify, or define precisely, the context within which to gauge
statutory meanings. They also share another challenge. Once an interpretive context is specified, both rely on a largely unanalyzed notion of reasonableness to determine ultimate meaning. For
purposivists, the touchstone for identifying statutory meaning is the
construct of a reasonable legislator.91 For textualists, the relevant actor is an imagined reasonable person who must determine not what
the legislature intended, but what its words mean, in context.92
Behind these structural parallels lie deeper commonalities.
Neither purposivism nor textualism possesses the resources to specify,
in advance, the appropriate breadth of the relevant interpretive context for resolving all issues of statutory meaning. In making that determination in particular cases, interpreters cannot be value neutral.
Similarly, for both purposivists and textualists, ascriptions of reasonableness require normative judgments.
In talking about textualists and purposivists, I necessarily paint
with a broad brush. Disagreements undoubtedly exist within both
camps.93 Moreover, there may be purer versions of those theories
88
See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 16 (“[W]hen the text of a statute is clear, that is the
end of the matter.”).
89
On the awakening of interest in theories of statutory interpretation, see Philip P.
Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77
MINN. L. REV. 241, 248–49 (1992).
90
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
91
See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 1378 (urging interpreters to presume that
the legislature consists of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”);
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 539
(1947) (arguing that “the judge must seek and effectuate” a statute’s “aim” or “policy”).
92
See, e.g., Manning, supra note 7, at 75.
93
Among textualists, for example, Justice Scalia accepts the traditional canon that
courts will not read statutes to dictate plainly “absurd” results, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 7, at 234, while Professor Manning argues on textualist grounds for abandoning the
absurdity canon, see Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2391.
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than the practice of judges, Justices, and commentators who are familiarly associated with them reflects.94 In Part III.B, I shall discuss questions framed by claims that avowedly purposivist and especially
textualist Justices have betrayed rather than applied their
methodologies in particular cases. Here, temporarily putting those
questions to one side, I assume that the decisions reached in practice
by textualist and purposivist judges, like the positions adopted by
scholars who align themselves with textualist or purposivist methodologies, illustrate plausible applications of those theories.
A. Purposivism
For purposivists, the relevant context for the interpretation of
statutes is what Professor Manning calls their “policy context,” involving evidence of the demonstrable and likely aims of the presumptively
reasonable legislators who enacted a provision in the first place.95
Modern purposivists characteristically draw their inspiration from,
and seek to refine, an approach initially developed by Professors
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.96 In Hart and Sacks’s approach, judges
should begin by reading statutes carefully and “then conjure up plausible organizing purposes for” them,97 predicated on the assumption
“that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”98
In cases involving interpretive dissonance, purposivists face obvious questions about the appropriate breadth of the relevant interpretive context. As is well known, many purposivists will sometimes
examine legislative history to find evidence of what the legislators who
enacted a statute sought to achieve.99 Even in the absence of specifically on-point legislative history, moreover, purposivists can broaden
94
See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
117, 121 (2009) (arguing that a “pure” version of textualism would allow “absurd” results).
95
See Manning, supra note 7, at 91.
96
See HART & SACKS, supra note 3.
97
Frickey, supra note 89, at 249.
98
HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 1378.
99
See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“Analysis of legislative history is . . . a traditional tool of statutory
construction. There is no reason why we must confine ourselves to, or begin our analysis
with, the statutory text if other tools of statutory construction provide better evidence of
congressional intent with respect to the precise point at issue.” (footnote omitted)); Wis.
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611 n.4 (1991) (“As for the propriety of using
legislative history[,] . . . common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it. As Chief Justice Marshall put it, ‘[w]here the
mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid
can be derived.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 358, 386 (1805))); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992) (arguing that “[l]egislative history helps a court
understand the context and purpose of a statute”).
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the information base that defines a statute’s policy context to encompass the entire range of values—some of which might stand in tension
with one another—that reasonable legislators presumably would have
held. In Riggs v. Palmer, for example, the court acknowledged the legislature’s aim of giving effect to testators’ expressed wishes but
surmised that reasonable lawmakers would also have wanted to exclude murderers from profiting from their crimes.100
The Riggs court’s decision to look to a relatively broad interpretive context reflected a value judgment. As Professor Manning has
recently emphasized, however, modern purposivists, or what he calls
“new purposivists,” begin with a strong presumption in favor of a narrowly defined interpretive context.101 Philip Frickey has cautioned
that “if I ask what ‘reasonable people pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably’ would have wanted in a given context, am I not likely to
assume that those reasonable people are similar to the reasonable person I know best—myself—and, thus, would want what I think is the
right answer?”102 Many, if not most, modern purposivists have taken
this concern to heart by emphasizing that a statute’s language almost
invariably furnishes the best evidence of its purpose,103 including
sometimes a purpose to dictate the appropriate means for pursuing
policy goals.104 Nevertheless, appeal to a broader context remains an
option when normatively inflected considerations militate sufficiently
powerfully in favor of doing so.
When, as in Riggs v. Palmer, the interpretive context is broadened
to encompass multiple values, some potentially in conflict with others,
the concept of reasonableness assumes central importance in
purposivist inquiries. The notion of reasonableness has psychological
and sociological aspects but also a normative component.105 So emphasizing, moral philosophers frequently draw a distinction between
the “rational,” which can be understood in purely instrumental,
self-interested terms, and the “reasonable,” which imports a disposition to behave in ways that give due consideration to the interests of
others.106 Especially in light of the well-recognized phenomenon of
100

See 22 N.E. 188, 189–90 (N.Y. 1889).
See Manning, supra note 2, at 152–65 (“[T]he new purposivism takes a crucial cue
about purpose more directly from Congress’s choice of words.”).
102
Frickey, supra note 89, at 251.
103
See Manning, supra note 2, at 130–31 & nn.83–86 (collecting examples).
104
See, e.g., id. at 140 (discussing a case where “the Court understood [a] key provision’s open-endedness . . . to invite development of . . . common law”).
105
See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323,
391 (2012) (maintaining that “a positive definition of reasonableness is a logical impossibility” because “no positive definition can satisfy” all of the axioms that a positive definition
would need to embrace).
106
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 49 n.1 (1993) (“[K]nowing that people
are rational we do not know the ends they will pursue, only that they will pursue them
101
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reasonable disagreement about many matters of fact and value,107 a
court determining how a reasonable person would resolve such disagreement must ascertain what would be most reasonable under the
circumstances—an inherently value-laden determination. The doctrine associated with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., which calls for courts to defer to any reasonable agency
determination of a vague or ambiguous statute,108 implicitly so recognizes. In the absence of an administrative agency, a court would need
to determine which reasonable interpretation was best or most reasonable. Even with perfect empirical knowledge, no purely statistical aggregation of what the people within a society actually think could
resolve the normative issue.109
Modern purposivists seldom deny that the construct of a reasonable legislator is necessarily value laden. Aharon Barak has prominently argued that statutes have “objective” purposes inhering in “the
interests, values, objectives, policy, and functions that the law should
realize in a democracy.”110 Yet the concepts that he invokes are so
plainly contestable as to betray any pretension of value neutrality.111
Justice Stephen Breyer, a leading modern purposivist, comes close to
acknowledging the point explicitly:
Instead of deriving an artificial meaning through the use of general
canons, the [purposivist] judge will ask instead how a (hypothetical)
reasonable member of Congress, given the statutory language, structure, history, and purpose, would have answered the question, had it
been presented. . . . Why refer to a hypothetical congressional desire? Why produce the complex and fictional statement, “it seems
unlikely Congress would have wanted courts to defer here?” The reason is that the fiction provides guidance of a kind roughly similar to
that offered by Professor Corbin’s “reasonable contracting party” in
intelligently. Knowing that people are reasonable where others are concerned, we know
that they are willing to govern their conduct by a principle from which they and others can
reason in common; and reasonable people take into account the consequences of their
actions on others’ well-being.” (citing W.M. Sibley, The Rational Versus the Reasonable, 62
PHIL. REV. 554, 560 (1953)); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 191–92 (1998)
(suggesting that rationality entails a simple capacity for means-ends analysis while reasonableness involves “tak[ing] others’ interests into account”).
107
Issues arising from reasonable disagreement are endemic both to law, see, e.g.,
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 4–6 (1999) (“Law . . . represents the aspiration
to justice of a community . . . not of those who think similarly, but of those who think
differently, about matters of common concern.” (emphasis omitted)), and to moral and
political philosophy, see, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 106, at 54–58 (discussing possible sources
of reasonable disagreement in political life).
108
467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
109
See Miller & Perry, supra note 105, at 326–27.
110
Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARV. L. REV. 19, 75 (2002).
111
See Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive
Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1135–36 (2008).
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contract cases. It focuses the judge’s attention on the fact that democratically elected individuals wrote the statute in order to satisfy
certain human purposes. And it consequently increases the likelihood that courts will ask what those individuals would have wanted
in light of those purposes.112

B. Textualism
In contrast with their predecessors in the “plain meaning” school,
modern textualists emphasize that Congress invariably legislates
against the background of a number of linguistic and cultural understandings that influence, and indeed determine, what a linguistically
competent person would understand a statute to say.113 In an exemplification of the new textualist position, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook
maintains that statutes defining criminal offenses and prescribing
penalties traditionally have been, and today should continue to be,
read as presupposing the availability of defenses such as insanity and
necessity:
For thousands of years, and in many jurisdictions, criminal statutes have been understood to operate only when the acts were unjustified. The agent who kills a would-be assassin of the Chief
Executive is justified, though the killing be willful; so too with the
person who kills to save his own life. . . . The process [by which
courts interpret statutes in light of historical context] is cooperative:
norms of interpretation and defense, like agreement on grammar
and diction, make it easier to legislate at the same time as they promote the statutory aim of saving life.114

Justice Scalia has similarly maintained that “Congress must be
presumed to draft . . . in light of . . . background principle[s].”115 He
strongly defends judicial reliance on a variety of canons of statutory
interpretation.116 His favorites include those that call for criminal
statutes to retain the common law requirement of mens rea,117 for
statutes not to apply extraterritorially to noncitizens,118 and for
112

Breyer, supra note 3, at 266–67 (footnote omitted).
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 33–34; Manning, supra note 7, at 92–93,
100–01.
114
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1876, 1913–14 (1997). But cf. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532
U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (describing as “an open question whether federal courts ever have
authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute”).
115
Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002).
116
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 69–339 (discussing interpretive canons and
their proper application).
117
See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
7, at 303.
118
See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 406; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 268–72.
113
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limitations periods to be “subject to ‘equitable tolling.’ ”119 Like Judge
Easterbrook, moreover, Justice Scalia sometimes views legal traditions
and background understandings that have not been distilled into canons of interpretation as crucial elements of the context from which
statutes derive their meaning. For example, as I have noted, he has
relied on a tradition of federal noninterference with state tax
collection to justify an exception to the § 1983 cause of action.120 He
has similarly assumed that § 1983 incorporates doctrines of official immunity, apparently because at least some state officials enjoyed immunity from damages liability in suits at common law.121 In Gregory v.
Ashcroft, Justice Scalia joined an opinion that relied on traditional legal understandings to conclude that a federal statute barring age discrimination by employers, specifically including states, did not apply
to state judges.122 According to the Court, traditional understandings
supported a presumption that if “Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute.”123
With Congress presumed to legislate in light of background social
and legal practices, and with reasonable interpreters determining statutory meaning in light of the same practices and understandings, it
becomes important to specify what a reasonable interpreter should be
deemed to know and to regard as relevant. In pondering this question, one might wonder whether there are conceptual limits to the
kinds of background information that textualists could—consistent
with the logic of their own theory—classify as part of a statute’s semantic context.
As I noted earlier, when textualists recognize that meaning depends on context, they move from the domain of what philosophers
of language call semantics—which is largely concerned with dictionary meanings and rules of grammar—to that of pragmatics, which
119
Young, 535 U.S. at 49–50 (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95
(1990)).
120
See Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 589
(1995) (“[W]e must interpret § 1983 in light of the strong background principle against
federal interference with state taxation.”). Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s opinion
for the Court. Id. at 582.
121
See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
122
501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991).
123
Id. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted). In a concurring opinion in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, relied on the Gregory presumption to
conclude that a federal statute did not “limit the power of States to restrict the delivery of
telecommunications services by their political subdivisions.” 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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deals with issues of meaning that depend on further considerations.124
Within that domain, textualists almost invariably insist that information about legislators’ psychological intentions and expectations is irrelevant.125 For them, what matters is “the way a reasonable person
conversant with relevant social and linguistic practices would have
used the words.”126 But apart from textualists’ exclusion of information about speakers’ or legislators’ intentions, the very point of reference to a legal text’s semantic context is frequently to explain that its
words do not mean what someone equipped only with dictionary definitions and knowledge of the rules of grammar could well take them
to mean—for example, that a statute making it unlawful to engage in
specified activities should not apply extraterritorially or that the statute of limitations does not apply because of the doctrine of equitable
tolling. Once the notion of semantic context is expanded to include
more information than dictionaries and grammar books can supply
and to authorize rejections of what otherwise would appear to be
statutes’ “plain meanings,”127 it becomes difficult to formulate even
moderately determinate rules for saying in advance which bits of information about the context of a statute’s enactment should be
deemed contextually relevant and irrelevant.128
Professor Manning suggests otherwise in an article in which he
criticizes “the absurdity doctrine.”129 In that article, Manning maintains that it would be objectionable for courts, in specifying the relevant semantic context for interpreting a statute, to rely on “social
values whose content and method of derivation are both unspecified
ex ante.”130 He distinguishes, and defends, judicial reliance on “conventions” that have congealed into previously recognized canons of
124

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 61 (“What any member of Congress thought
his words would do is irrelevant. We do not care about his mental processes.”); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (“The new textualism
posits that once the Court has ascertained a statute’s plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant. Legislative history should not even be consulted to
confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text.”); Manning, supra note 7, at 84 (noting
that “textualists generally forgo reliance on legislative history as an authoritative source of
[statutory] purpose”). Occasionally, textualists are willing to consult legislative history for
certain narrow purposes. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (relying on legislative history “to verify that
what seems to us an unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought of”); Nelson, supra
note 75, at 360 nn.37–38 (citing examples).
126
Manning, supra note 7, at 91.
127
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing new textualists’ divergence
from an older plain meaning school).
128
See Greene, supra note 45, at 1923 (asserting that textualists’ “combination of reliance on unexamined background knowledge plus the cutting off of additional knowledge
is an error”).
129
Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8.
130
Id. at 2471.
125
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statutory interpretation131 but says that if textualists are to “follow
their premises to a logical conclusion, then they must . . . treat[ ] the
existing set of background conventions as a closed set.”132
Manning’s suggestion that the appropriate semantic context for
interpreting statutes consists entirely of conventions specified ex ante
is not only inconsistent with the practice of textualist judges such as
Judge Easterbrook and Justices Scalia and Thomas—who have not
maintained that the substantive background understandings relevant
to statutory interpretation reside exclusively in previously recognized
interpretive conventions133—but also unworkable. Consider, for example, how a textualist should address the interpretive issues that
would arise under an ordinance barring “vehicles” from a park. In
discussing whether baby strollers would come within that prohibition,
the textualist Justice Scalia sorts through a range of definitions from
different dictionaries before concluding that “[t]he proper colloquial
meaning . . . is simply a sizable wheeled conveyance” and that baby
strollers do not come within the exclusion.134 This analysis may be
defensible,135 but it surely does not rely solely on conventions or other
precepts that the defender of a particular theory of statutory interpretation could sensibly be asked to include, ex ante, in an exclusive compilation of available, reasonably determinate interpretive premises.
One might, I suppose, maintain that Justice Scalia’s analysis simply
applies the “ordinary-meaning canon,” which posits that “[w]ords are
to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the
context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”136 But this maneuver would postpone the problem, not solve it. In law as elsewhere, the
functioning of language in producing ordinary, everyday meanings is
too complex, fluid, and intuitive to be reduced to a determinate list of
rules set out in advance.
An illustration of the need for context-by-context judgment
comes from the recent case of Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona,
Inc.,137 which presented the question of whether a federal statute
mandating that states “accept and use” a federal form in registering
131

See id. at 2473–74 & n.317.
Id. at 2474.
133
They did not, for example, take this position in either the National Private Truck
Council case, discussed in supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text, nor did Justice Scalia
do so in Gregory v. Ashcroft, described in supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
134
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 37–38.
135
But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 561 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (characterizing Justice Scalia’s purportedly purely textual analysis as “crazy” insofar as it purported to exclude the purpose of the
statute).
136
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 69.
137
133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
132
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voters precluded Arizona from demanding more than that form required.138 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that “the
implication of” the “accept and use” requirement was that the state
must treat satisfaction of the form’s demands as sufficient for registration.139 Dissenting, Justice Samuel Alito thought that the state had
complied with the federal statute as long as it had “use[d] the form as
a meaningful part of the registration process.”140 Regardless of how
one judges this argument, surely no one could have thought that the
Justices, in resolving the dispute, were limited to consulting a settled
list of conventions of language use that they could have stated in advance. When Manning says that if textualists are to “follow their premises to a logical conclusion, then they must . . . treat[ ] the existing set
of background conventions as a closed set,”141 he asks for more than
any theory could possibly deliver.142
Indeed, if a theory (such as textualism) tried to incorporate
within itself rules for its own application, then someone could always
demand to see the principles specifying how those prescriptions
should in turn be interpreted143—and could further ask for a specification of the relevant semantic or policy context for interpreting the
rules purportedly dictating how the theory’s first-order interpretive
principles should be applied. At this point, the demand for prescriptive interpretive rules and rules for the specification of relevant
interpretive contexts would pose a threat of infinite regress.144
138

See id. at 2251.
Id. at 2254.
140
Id. at 2274 (Alito, J., dissenting).
141
Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2474.
142
Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 118–20 (2009) (asserting
the dependence of theories of legal interpretation on moral theory and denying the possibility of “a general theory of legal interpretation” or an “operational” moral theory that
would prescribe correct conclusions to someone who did not already have good moral
judgment).
143
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
144
In order to determine how precepts and theories apply to particular cases, we ordinarily count not on proliferating layers of interpretive rules but, instead, on the availability
of a foundational human capacity such as that of “understanding” with respect to utterances that require no clarification, see ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY
22 (1992); PATTERSON, supra note 56, at 86–87, or to a faculty such as that of “judgment,”
see BEINER, supra note 57, at 130–31. According to Professor Ronald Beiner’s account,
“[j]udgment is a natural capacity of human beings that . . . enables us to appraise particulars without dependence upon rules or rule-governed technique . . . .” BEINER, supra, at 8.
A large, complex philosophical literature on judgment aims to explain both the possibility
conditions for the existence and application of such a faculty and the empirical constituents of sound practical decision making. See id. at 129–52 (discussing theories of judgment
including those of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, and Hans-Georg Gadamer).
Putting the metaphysics of judgment to one side, I would emphasize that conclusions concerning how prescriptive rules or principles are best applied in particular cases depend not
only on the apprehension of facts but also on determinations of the relative priority of
sometimes competing values in particular contexts. See id. at 95 (noting that for Aristotle,
139
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In sum, lacking the resources to offer algorithmic prescriptions
regarding the content of interpretive contexts, textualists, like
purposivists, face choices about how narrowly or broadly to define the
interpretive context for the resolution of particular puzzles about statutory meaning. And it is a fair generalization, I think, that they—in
parallel with purposivists—tend to broaden the context to admit more
information about background understandings and expectations
when failure to do so would produce normatively jarring consequences. Although I cannot prove this point, suggestive evidence
comes from the cases that I discussed earlier in which textualist judges
have invoked background understandings to justify their readings of
statutes as including nontextual exceptions.145 In so saying, I do not
mean to imply that textualist interpreters routinely admit just enough
information into the interpretive context to reach the result that they
would have preferred if they occupied the capacity of legislators. Frequently, I assume, they could not plausibly do so, even if they wished.
Sometimes, however, a broadening of the interpretive context will
make it plausible to reach interpretive conclusions that would not otherwise have been plausible. When this is so, textualists have no basis
for deciding what is in and what is out without making some sort of
normative judgment. I shall say more about this point below.
A second challenge for textualists emerges when decisions about
how to interpret a statute hinge on the judgments of a reasonable
interpreter. Textualists then must determine what a reasonable interpreter—when apprised, for example, that § 1983 was enacted against
a background of historic noninterference with state tax collection or
of official immunity in suits for damages—would make of this
practical judgment is “geared to determination of the proper ends”); id. at 106 (pointing
out that Aristotle and Kant agree on “the elusiveness of principles upon which to judge
particulars” because “there are no fixed universals for the subsumption of such particulars”). Accordingly, appeals to the existence of a shared capacity of judgment leave us far
short of a determinate formula for how interpretive contexts should be specified or what
considerations should influence the determination.
Another problem with assuming that a shared faculty of human judgment could solve
the problem of determining how broadly or narrowly a statute’s interpretive context
should be defined—without need for interpreters to make contestable value judgments—
involves the psychological phenomenon of “motivated reasoning.” See Dan M. Kahan,
Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19 (2011) (defining “motivated reasoning” as “the unconscious tendency of individuals to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the formation of accurate beliefs”). Modern psychological research has confirmed what common
sense has always suggested: human beings have a powerful psychological propensity to determine facts and appraise arguments in ways that accord with their preexisting, ideologically inflected beliefs and preferences. See id. at 19–26. If asked whether a narrow
semantic or policy context was too narrow to yield the proper answer to a particular interpretive question, most people would probably say yes if, but only if, they hoped that a
broader context would license a conclusion that they adjudged more attractive.
145
See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text.
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information. This inquiry may be partly sociological, but it is also, as I
have said, partly normative. It requires the ascription to the reasonable interpreter of normative beliefs as well as factual knowledge.146
Moreover, in order to make sense of a statute as the utterance of a
legislature, the reasonable textualist interpreter will need, in turn, to
ascribe at least an objective intent—and presumably a reasonable objective intent—to the enacting body.147
The search for such an objective intent presents formidable challenges. H.P. Grice’s influential theory148 holds that in ordinary conversation, “the content asserted by a speaker just is the content that
the speaker intended to convey to the hearer by expressing the utterance in the particular context that she did.”149 But textualists of
course reject any account of statutory meaning that depends straightforwardly on either the actual intentions of the legislature or the hypothesized intentions or purposes of reasonable legislators (beyond
the minimal purpose or intent of enacting meaningful legislation written, in the United States, in English).150 When textualists instead direct attention to the alternative construct of a reasonable listener, the
difficulty is that a reasonable listener normally seeks to understand a
speaker’s utterances based partly on assumptions about the speaker.
When textualism insists that only the most minimal assumptions can
be made, it may threaten to deprive the reasonable listener of information or assumptions about the speaker that the reasonable listener
may need in order to grasp the meaning of the speaker’s words in the
context of their utterance. When textualists, at the same time, maintain that the words of a statute reflect an objective intent, it is not clear
to what the phrase “objective intent” might refer unless textualists are
in fact making assumptions about the knowledge and purposes of
some actual or imagined speaker.151 The difficulty becomes sharply
visible when textualists, such as Justice Scalia, avowedly reject proposed interpretations on the ground that they compel results “that no
sensible person could have intended.”152
In maintaining that textualists, in parallel with purposivists, must
make value-laden ascriptions of reasonableness, I do not mean to imply that the ascribed values will always prove controversial. The canons of statutory construction, which can be grouped variously into
146

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See Manning, supra note 7, at 79.
148
See supra note 74.
149
Marmor, supra note 42, at 7 (describing “a neo-Gricean view”).
150
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
151
See Nelson, supra note 75, at 354.
152
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519
U.S. 316, 335–36 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
147
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categories,153 furnish an instructive range of examples. The
“surplusage canon,” which holds that “[i]f possible, every word and
every provision is to be given effect,”154 assumes that the actual or hypothesized speaker—of whom the interpreter strives to act as a faithful agent—valued economy of expression and, accordingly, should be
understood as having uttered only words that make a difference. The
“harmonious-reading canon,” which prescribes that “[t]the provisions
of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible,
not contradictory,”155 ascribes comparably thin or noncontroversial
values involving a preference for noncontradiction and practical efficacy. Yet, sticking for the moment solely to the canons, a textualist
interpreter begins to ascribe more plainly substantive and potentially
more controversial values when assuming that statutes should be presumed not to apply extraterritorially.156 Plainly, moreover, the imputed values grow still more ideologically charged when a court
applies the rule of lenity157 or the presumptions against waivers of sovereign immunity158 and federal statutory abrogation of state sovereign
immunity.159
When canons are long established, textualists sometimes say,
Congress is well aware of them, and its failure to legislate around
them provides important evidence of “what might be considered the
genuine intent of the statute.”160 But the assumption that reasonable
legislators draft with the canons of interpretation in mind itself depends on a normatively inflected conception of reasonableness. According to a recent empirical study, most Senate and House staffers
have little awareness of some of the canons and often consciously
153
For example, Professor William N. Eskridge, in categorizing the canons championed by Justice Scalia, arranges them under different headings. Compare SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 7, at ix (listing the canons in the table of contents), with Eskridge, supra note
135, at 552–60.
154
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 174.
155
Id. at 180.
156
See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (noting
that the canon presuming that statutes do not apply extraterritorially “serves to protect
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result
in international discord” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991))). Justice Scalia, who joined the majority opinion in Kiobel, has argued in favor of
stricter enforcement of the canon, which he acknowledges is “sometimes ignored,” SCALIA
& GARNER, supra note 7, at 272, presumably on the ground that it embodies good sense.
Scalia argues that “[l]egislators must know what to expect,” id., but for that purpose the
opposite presumption would serve as well.
157
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 296 (explicating the rule of lenity as prescribing that “[a]mbiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor”).
158
See id. at 281.
159
See id. at 288–89. For discussion of “the normativity” of a number of the canons
that textualists favor, see Eskridge, supra note 135, at 552–60.
160
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1941 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

R
R
R

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 31

TEXTUALIST AND PURPOSIVIST THEORIES

2-MAY-14

9:01

715

reject others, rather than drafting in light of them, in response to political or other considerations.161 If so, most members of Congress
seem likely to be similarly unaware of some of the canons and to be
equally disposed to reject others as drafting guides162—even if more
“reasonable” members would be better informed and would frame
legislation differently.
The point, moreover, is not limited to the canons of interpretation. It involves a more pervasive, ultimately ineradicable phenomenon in the interpretation of statutory language: statutory
interpretation requires the ascription of values, whether to legislators
or reasonable interpreters of legislation, and the choice of which values to ascribe—including those that help to constitute reasonableness—cannot itself be value free.
In ascribing values, I again hasten to add, a textualist interpreter
does not need to assume, and indeed should not assume, that every
statute will reflect the views of a speaker who is, by the interpreter’s
lights, correct in every normative respect.163 As I have recognized,
judges can recognize that their own values likely diverge from those of
the legislature. Nevertheless, the prospect of rule-based, advance resolution of all issues of reasonableness in the interpretation of statutes
is plainly illusory. Frequently, textualist interpreters, as much as
purposivists, must determine how to apply statutes—and indeed how
to apply the canons of interpretation—in interpretive contexts in
which reasonable people can differ and judgments need to be made
about what is most reasonable.
An example comes from Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, in which the Supreme Court divided
6–3 over whether the Department of the Interior permissibly interpreted a provision that makes it an offense to “take” an endangered
species as applying to actions by private landowners that destroy endangered species’ habitats.164 According to Professor Eskridge’s tally,
“[t]here were more than a dozen [applicable] canons [of interpretation] available for the Justices, and they deployed them like battlefield
weapons.”165 For the majority, Justice John Stevens held that
the agency’s interpretation was a reasonable one and therefore
161
See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Shultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 926–64 (2013).
162
See id. at 923.
163
Cf. David K. Henderson, The Principle of Charity and the Problem of Irrationality (Translation and the Problem of Irrationality), 73 SYNTHESE 225, 226–27 (1987) (arguing that the
principle of charity disfavors but should not preclude some ascriptions of irrationality).
164
515 U.S. 687, 690 (1995).
165
Eskridge, supra note 135, at 545.
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commanded judicial deference.166 Writing in dissent for the Court’s
three most conservative Justices, Justice Scalia began his opinion with
what Eskridge describes as a “normative cri de coeur”167 that may reveal the ultimate foundation for the dissenters’ judgment about how
the statute would most reasonably be read: “The Court’s holding that
the hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on
private lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not
just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land
conscripted to national zoological use.”168
Textualists sometimes insist that any background principle be formulated at the lowest possible level of generality.169 As some of the
cases that I discussed will have illustrated, however, that is not an approach that the textualist Justices have consistently taken. Another
example comes from Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., in which
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined an opinion (by Chief Justice John
Roberts) that applied the canon disfavoring extraterritorial
166

Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708.
Eskridge, supra note 135, at 548.
168
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting). McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct.
1924 (2013), furnishes another, more recent example of normatively charged disagreement about interpretive reasonableness in a relatively broad interpretive context. In
McQuiggin, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s majority opinion for five Justices held, over Justice Scalia’s dissent for four, that the statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) includes an
implicit equitable exception for cases in which the petitioner makes a showing of actual
innocence. See id. at 1928. Both majority and dissent agreed that “Congress legislates
against the backdrop of existing law,” compare id. at 1935 n.3 (majority opinion), with id. at
1942 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting); that given the background of existing law, AEDPA’s statute
of limitations was plausibly interpreted as being subject to equitable tolling, compare id. at
1934 (majority), with id. at 1941–42 (dissent); and that the background also included decisions in which the Court had treated judicially developed limitations on access to habeas as
subject to a “miscarriage of justice” exception encompassing cases in which petitioners
could make adequate demonstrations of actual innocence, compare id. at 1931 (majority),
with id. at 1938–39 (dissent). With this much agreed, Justice Scalia thought that the majority’s conclusion that Congress had legislated against the background of a “miscarriage of
justice exception to . . . various threshold barriers to relief” occurred “only at an uninformative level of generality” and that no precisely specified background principle applied to
the case at hand, which involved a statutory rather than a judge-made barrier to habeas
relief. Id. at 1942 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg countered by querying
why, given the dissent’s concession that “equitable tolling ‘can be seen as a reasonable
assumption of genuine legislative intent,’” and given the existence of judge-made exceptions to other barriers to habeas relief to avoid miscarriages of justice, “is it not an equally
reasonable assumption that Congress would want a limitations period to yield when what is
at stake is a State’s incarceration of an individual for a crime . . . no reasonable person
would find he committed?” Id. at 1935 n.3 (majority opinion).
169
Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion of
Scalia, J.) (maintaining that the appropriate “level of generality” at which to identify a
constitutionally pertinent tradition is “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified”). For discussion
of the pertinence of levels of generality and the difficulties in establishing them without
making value judgments, see generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
167
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application of U.S. law to a statute that was “strictly jurisdictional” and
did “not directly regulate conduct or afford relief,” despite acknowledging that the canon ordinarily applies only to statutes that “regulat[e] conduct.”170 Nor is it always clear what a prescription to
formulate background principles at their lowest levels of generality
would mean. In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., Justice
Alito’s dissenting opinion would have applied the “presumption
against pre-emption” of state law to hold that the National Voter Registration Act did not displace a state requirement that prospective
registrants present documentary proof of citizenship.171 For the majority, Justice Scalia held that canon inapplicable because “[w]e have
never mentioned such a principle in our Elections Clause cases.”172 I
would not know whether this reasoning applies the background presumption against preemption at the lowest level of generality or
whether it carves out an exception to that presumption.
Ultimately, however, there is no need to belabor the point. Even
if one could make sense of the idea that background principles
should be stated at the lowest level of generality, and could apply it
consistently, it seems clear that that precept, by itself, could not eliminate the need for more substantive judgments of reasonableness in
many cases. For example, I have no idea how it would apply to such
puzzles as whether baby strollers would come within a rule dictating
“no vehicles in the park.”
Issues about whether one federal statute has impliedly repealed
or displaced another further illustrate the need for textualists and
purposivists to make comparably value-based judgments,173 involving
either what a reasonable legislator would have intended or a reasonable person would understand. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB,174 for example, the question was whether the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986175 (IRCA), which made it a crime for
an employee knowingly to tender or for an employer knowingly to
accept false identification documents in connection with hiring, impliedly barred reinstatement and backpay remedies for undocumented workers whose discharges for engaging in union organizing
constituted clear violations of the National Labor Relations Act
170

133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
133 S. Ct. 2247, 2271 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
172
Id. at 2256.
173
Such issues arise nearly ubiquitously in the modern administrative state, in which
new legislation routinely threatens to conflict with existing statutory regulation touching
the same domain. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 265, 302–03 (2013).
174
535 U.S. 137 (2002).
175
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
171
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(NLRA). The Court’s five-member conservative majority, which included the textualist Justices Scalia and Thomas, ruled that “awarding
backpay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA,”176
which it evidently regarded as plainly inferable from the statute’s text.
Dissenting, Justice Breyer thought it more reasonable to find no displacement of the NLRA’s reinstatement and backpay remedies, partly
because the preclusion of remedies would reduce deterrence of
obvious NLRA violations.177 There is no need to judge the merits of
these competing arguments. For present purposes, all that matters is
this: the disagreement between the majority and the dissenting opinions pervasively reflected conflicting, normatively laden judgments of
reasonableness, even if the Justices did not explicitly use that term.
To cite just one more example of how textualists must decide
which values to ascribe to reasonable interpreters as much as
purposivists must ascribe values to hypothesized reasonable legislators,
the question occasionally arises whether a statute’s provision of a remedy merely creates that particular remedy or, alternatively, whether it
also precludes other possible remedies, such as the cause of action
provided by § 1983 against state officials who violate federal statutory
rights.178 Language that provides a remedy might be regarded as ambiguous in this respect: it is either a grant, with no other implications,
or it is a grant combined with an implied preclusion. And resolution
of the ambiguity, which requires a judgment about how statutory language is most reasonably read in context, frequently involves an element of normative evaluation. In § 1983 cases, textualists who are also
conservatives are thus predictably more prone than liberals to read a
statute’s provision of one remedy as impliedly excluding the cause of
action that § 1983 otherwise generically provides for violations of federal statutory rights,179 probably because they would regard the
176

Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 148–49.
Id. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Without the possibility of the deterrence that
backpay provides, the Board can impose only future-oriented obligations upon
law-violating employers—for it has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal. And in the
absence of the backpay weapon, employers could conclude that they can violate the labor
laws at least once with impunity.” (citation omitted)). Justice Breyer also argued that the
majority’s holding contravened the purposes of the IRCA, one of which was to create disincentives for employers to hire undocumented workers. See id. at 155–56. According to
Justice Breyer, allowing employers to fire undocumented workers with impunity in retaliation for labor organizing would make such workers more attractive as prospective employees than legal workers. See id.
178
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 970–72 (discussing statutory supersession of
§ 1983 remedies).
179
See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005) (“The
provision of an express, private means of redress in the statute itself is ordinarily an indication that Congress did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under § 1983.”);
Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)
(“When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive,
177
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provision of duplicate remedies as so improvident that (they think) no
reasonable observer would view Congress, absent some explicit indication of intent to do so, as having made such a provision. From a liberal perspective, duplicative remedies would sometimes seem more
reasonable.
C. Two Parallels Further Illustrated: Interpretive Contexts and
Judgments of Reasonableness
A further discussion of the cases finding implied exceptions to
the § 1983 cause of action, when juxtaposed with the much-discussed
Holy Trinity decision, will highlight the parallelism of the challenges
for purposivists and textualists in specifying the context within which
statutory interpretation should occur and in determining what it
would be most reasonable to infer within those contexts.
Both textualists and purposivists have avoided the conclusion that
§ 1983 creates an exceptionless cause of action that renders state officials liable for all constitutional violations. Textualists have done so by
taking a broad view of the semantic context in which Congress enacted the statute.180 In National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma
Tax Commission, the textualist Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
reasoned that historical practice supported a “presumption that federal law generally will not interfere with administration of state
taxes.”181 Similar processes of reasoning apparently underlie textualist Justices’ support for the availability of official immunity in § 1983
actions. Broadening the interpretive context to include the background of limitations on common law causes of action against state
officials182 and of related immunity doctrines against which § 1983
they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under
§ 1983.”).
180
Although Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 421–22 (1989), characterizes § 1983 as “delegat[ing] power to make common
law,” the Court does not consistently treat § 1983 as a de facto, across-the-board delegation
to it of common lawmaking authority, on a par, for example, with the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Compare, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899–900
(2007) (“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law
statute.”), with Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 588
(1995) (“Congress did not authorize injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983 in state
tax cases . . . .”), and Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 507 (1982) (“[T]he 1871
Congress did not intend that an individual be compelled in every case to exhaust state
administrative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act.”). In any
event, a textualist who believed that § 1983 could be appropriately characterized as a “common law statute,” subject to special interpretive principles, would need to explain that
conclusion by reference to a very broad, and contestable, specification of the statute’s interpretive context.
181
515 U.S. 582, 588 (1995).
182
See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483–84 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (“[T]o determine whether there is any bar to [a § 1983] suit, we look first to the common law of
torts.”).
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was enacted,183 a number of Supreme Court opinions—some of them
written or joined by textualist Justices—have concluded that § 1983
should not be understood as creating particular causes of action not
recognized at common law184 and as presumptively retaining common
law immunity defenses.185
To cite just one more example, the Court has also assumed that
§ 1983 creates no right to federal injunctive relief against a variety of
pending state judicial proceedings.186 In an attempt to rationalize its
precedents in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., in an opinion
joined by the textualist Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Court noted
that the historical practice of courts in sometimes declining to exercise equity jurisdiction “informs our understanding of the jurisdiction
Congress has conferred upon the federal courts.”187
Even with the interpretive context broadened, the conclusion
that § 1983 retains common law and equitable limitations on suits
against state officials requires a further analytical step, involving a determination of what a reasonable interpreter would infer from the
context of the statute’s enactment. On this point, the Court’s reasoning invites an obvious challenge. A clear purpose of § 1983—or, in
the vocabulary preferred by textualists, a plain aspect of its “objective
183
See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 279–80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing “a well-established common-law privilege [that existed] in 1871, when § 1983
was enacted”); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497–98 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “the common-law practice, which
governs whether absolute immunity exists under § 1983, is that this prosecutorial action
would have enjoyed only qualified immunity”).
184
See, e.g., Heck, 512 U.S. at 483–84 (holding that § 1983 was unavailable for bringing
a plaintiff’s wrongful imprisonment claim because common law malicious prosecution actions required “termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused”).
185
See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55 (1967) (“The legislative record [of
§ 1983] gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law
immunities.”). In Rehberg v. Paulk, the Court noted that while its “approach is tied to the
common law’s identification of the functions that merit the protection of absolute immunity, the Court’s precedents have not mechanically duplicated the precise scope of the
absolute immunity that the common law provided to protect those functions,” but instead
have innovated where necessary to accommodate modern policy concerns. 132 S. Ct. 1497,
1503–04 (2012). Due in part to stare decisis, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have acquiesced in an approach that strays from the common law in certain instances. See, e.g., Kalina
v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132–35 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Heck, 512 U.S. at 491
(Thomas, J., concurring).
186
See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (holding that “the possible
unconstitutionality of a statute ‘on its face’ does not in itself justify an injunction against
good-faith attempts to enforce it” and declining to consider whether any Act of Congress
authorizes such an injunction). But see Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers,
and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 84 (1984) (“The language of the
relevant statutes leaves no room for judicial limitation or modification . . . . Moreover, the
very purpose of [the Reconstruction] legislation [often involved in abstention cases] was to
interpose the federal judiciary between the state and individual, largely because of concern
about the functioning of state judiciaries.”).
187
517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996).
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intent”188—was to alter the prior legal landscape by subjecting state
officials to suits that the common law did not authorize.189 Nevertheless, moved by a sense of interpretive dissonance and the value judgments that underlie it, the Court’s textualists have concluded that a
reasonable interpreter would understand § 1983 as not having
displaced some common law and equitable limitations on suits against
state officials in the absence of a clear statement to that effect.
In a number of leading cases, purposivists—presumably animated
by the same sense of interpretive dissonance—have not disagreed.
The Court’s ruling in National Private Truck Council was unanimous. It
could have been explained as easily by reference to Congress’s likely
purposes as by a tradition-based presumption about the meaning of
statutory language. Without always being explicit about their reasoning, even purposivist Supreme Court Justices—beginning in Tenney v.
Brandhove190 and continuing into the present day—have also consistently assumed that the considerations often invoked to justify official
immunity from damages liability formed part of the policy context in
which Congress enacted § 1983. Although Congress’s most central
animating purpose was to authorize suits against officials who violated
constitutional rights,191 reasonable legislators pursuing reasonable
goals in reasonable ways might also have recognized, and wanted to
accommodate, the values that would tend to support officials’ immunity from personal liability in damages actions192 and counsel federal

188

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 485–86, 493–94.
190
341 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1951).
191
In one famously unguarded description of § 1983’s policy context, the Supreme
Court said:
Th[e] legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that
it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that
state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; . . . and it believed
that these failings extended to the state courts. . . . Section 1983 was thus a
product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism that had
prevailed in the late 18th century . . . . The very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
192
Either the ultimate example of interpretive purposivism or its limiting case came in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), in which the Court self-consciously reformulated
the standard for defining the qualified immunity that most officials enjoy. The Court’s
analysis was almost wholly policy driven. If the Court’s opinion can be squeezed into the
framework of any theory of statutory interpretation at all, it reflected the Justices’ assumptions about what “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably,” HART &
SACKS, supra note 3, at 1378, would have wanted immunity doctrine to be in light of the
realities of modern litigation.
189
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judicial abstention from equitable interference with pending state judicial proceedings.193
In Holy Trinity,194 as in the § 1983 immunity cases, the propriety
of the Court’s recognition of an implied ministerial exception to the
Alien Contract Labor Act—analogous to the § 1983 exception for
cases subject to judge-made official immunity doctrines—hinges
partly on the breadth of the interpretive context in which the statute
is read and partly on judgments of reasonableness. Purposivists could
easily divide about the statute’s application, depending on whether
they take a broad or a narrow view of its policy context. On a narrow
view, the driving aim of the Alien Contract Labor Act was to preserve
American jobs for Americans and, as the statute said, to bar efforts by
American employers to entice foreigners here “to perform labor or
service of any kind.”195 Nevertheless, in a leading example of
purposivist analysis, the Court famously adopted a broader characterization of the policy context. In addition to citing legislative history
suggesting that Congress was predominantly concerned with “the influx of . . . cheap unskilled labor,”196 the Court noted the religious
character of the nation and specifically reasoned that Congress, presumably sharing in a historically widespread solicitude for religious
organizations and practices, would not have intended to impede a
congregation’s choice of a minister.197
Although it may be less obvious, textualists would confront a parallel choice about whether to adopt a narrow or a broad view of the
Alien Contract Labor Act’s semantic context. Abundant historical evidence existed—indeed, as the Court put it, “the whole history and life
of the country” affirmed—that “this is a religious nation”198 whose
people and legislators have traditionally accorded religious institutions extraordinary respect.199 If textualists postulate that nontextual
193
As David Shapiro has put it, the Court reads jurisdiction-conferring statutes against
the background of “experience and tradition”—which might be redescribed as either a
semantic or a policy context—in light of which it has felt free to identify circumstances in
which statutes should be “read as an authorization to the court to entertain an action but
not as an inexorable command” to do so. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574–75 (1985).
194
143 U.S. 457 (1892).
195
Id. at 458 (quoting the language of the Alien Contract Labor Act). Professor
Manning thus emphasizes that modern “nontextualist” Justices of the Supreme Court, or
what he calls “new purposivists,” have joined the Court’s textualists in “the rejection of Holy
Trinity.” Manning, supra note 2, at 115, 129.
196
Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 465. But see VERMEULE, supra note 28, at 93–102 (arguing
that the Court misapprehended the legislative history, which in fact supported the conclusion that the statute applied to the facts of the case).
197
See 143 U.S. at 471–72.
198
Id. at 470, 472.
199
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509,
1518 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (1997)) (asserting that in its historical context the Alien Contract Labor Act’s
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background conditions can justify the recognition of nontextually
based “necessity” defenses against criminal prosecutions and a variety
of nonstatutory exceptions to the § 1983 cause of action, then the refusal to treat background conditions as relevant in the Holy Trinity
case reflects a choice.200
Support for the proposition that textualism includes the resources to recognize an implied “ministerial exception” to a facially
unqualified statutory prohibition—if not in Holy Trinity then in cases
involving different statutes201 —comes from a modern, partly
reference to “labor or service” would have been understood to mean “physical and helper
work”).
200
I do not mean to imply that textualists should necessarily regard Holy Trinity as a
hard or contestable case. Other considerations of concern to textualists would undoubtedly have cut strongly against the Court’s decision, with the most important being a provision of the statute that made “specific exceptions” for, among others, “professional actors,
artists, lecturers, singers and domestic servants.” 143 U.S. at 458–59. Among the canons of
interpretation much favored by textualists is one prescribing that “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius”—when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned, others of the same
class are excluded. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 107–11.
201
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, a unanimous
Supreme Court followed what it characterized as the uniform practice of the courts of
appeals with regard to modern antidiscrimination legislation by recognizing a “ministerial
exception” to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 & n.2, 706
(2012). In the first of the modern cases finding a ministerial exception to Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, the Fifth Circuit relied on the canon counseling construction of
statutes to avoid “a serious doubt of constitutionality” in holding that “Congress did not
intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church and minister.” McClure v. Salvation
Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972). Following McClure, eight other circuit courts
explicitly adopted a ministerial exception, see Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The
Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1778 & n.19 (2008), which
they also extended to statutes such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state common law claims against religious employers, see Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007) (collecting
cases). But the Fourth Circuit broke with McClure by concluding that the statutory language would not support a construction that exempted suits by ministers from its coverage
and by putting its decision squarely on constitutional grounds. See Rayburn v. Gen.
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1165, 1167 (4th Cir. 1985). Thereafter, other circuits seem generally to have followed Rayburn in characterizing their conclusions as constitutionally dictated, see Benton C. Martin, Comment, Protecting Preachers from
Prejudice: Methods for Improving Analysis of the Ministerial Exception to Title VII, 59 EMORY L.J.
1297, 1304–06 (2010), though the Ninth Circuit, in Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of
Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1999), said it was adopting a “narrowing construction of
Title VII.” See also Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“Whereas some courts have derived the ministerial exception from the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, others have determined that, under its plain language, Title VII applies
to ministerial employment decisions, but they have nevertheless concluded that such an
application is unconstitutional.” (citations omitted)).
In establishing that “the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of
a ‘ministerial exception’ . . . that precludes application of [antidiscrimination] legislation
to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its
ministers,” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705, the Supreme Court did not distinguish among
lower court cases that had based the exception on grounds of statutory interpretation pursuant to the “avoidance canon” and those that had held statutes unconstitutional insofar as
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analogous case, Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, in which the textualist Justice
Thomas contemplated the possibility that a federal statute otherwise
mandating adherence to employees’ designation of their intended
beneficiaries under employee benefit plans might tolerate an implied
exception for cases involving “murdering heir[s].”202 Citing Riggs v.
Palmer, Justice Thomas noted that “the principle underlying” state statutes that preclude murderers from receiving property as a result of
their killing “is well established in the law and has a long historical
pedigree predating” the federal statute.203 As a result, Justice Thomas
suggested, that background principle arguably formed a part of the
social context in which the federal statute would need to be interpreted if a case involving a murderous designated beneficiary should
actually arise.
Even as he made this concession, however, Justice Thomas’s opinion in Egelhoff refused to broaden the relevant interpretive context to
include background principles of state law recognizing that divorces
alter previously professed desires to benefit divorced spouses. If decisions to broaden an interpretive context are bound up with
value-laden judgments of reasonableness, then so are refusals to do so.
In neither case could the determination of the appropriate interpretive context be wholly value neutral.
D. Corroborating Empirical Studies
Also supporting my thesis that judges’ values tend to play parallel,
ineradicable roles within textualist and purposivist methodologies—
both in defining the breadth of relevant interpretive contexts and in
making related judgments of reasonableness—are empirical studies
indicating that, regardless of the methodology that Supreme Court
Justices employ, their ideological predispositions strongly influence
their voting patterns in statutory interpretation cases. In one such
study, Professor William Eskridge and Lauren Baer examined cases
they failed to provide a ministerial exemption. Nor did the Court wholly resolve the ambiguity in its own analysis. It began by stating “[w]e agree there is . . . a ministerial exception.” Id. at 706. Although this language might suggest an “avoidance” approach, the
Court then spoke of a plain constitutional dictate. See id. (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right
to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state the
power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”). See also id. at 709 n.4 (holding that the ministerial exception “operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar”).
202
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001).
203
Id. Justice Thomas appeared to contemplate that state rather than federal law
might govern, with the federal statute’s preemption clause including an implied exception
for state “‘slayer’ statutes,” rather than directly precluding murderers from benefiting from
their wrongs. See id.
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decided from 1984 to 2006 involving judicial review of federal administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations.204 They found that Justice
Scalia, who is both a textualist and a conservative, affirmed agency
decisions 71.6% of the time when the decisions were “conservative,”
but only 53.8% of the time when the decisions were “liberal”—a disparity of 17.8%.205 For Justice Thomas, the differential was an even
larger 29%: although he upheld 75.8% of the conservative agency rulings that came before the Court, the figure dropped to 46.8% when
agencies issued liberal interpretations.206 By comparison, the avowedly purposivist Justice Breyer, a liberal, went along with conservative
agency rulings 64.9% of the time, while he voted to affirm 79.5% of
the liberal agency interpretations that he reviewed in the period that
Eskridge and Baer examined.207
As Eskridge emphasizes, these findings tend more to refute than
to support claims that textualism better constrains judges from voting
in accord with their ideological preferences than does purposivism.208
Justice Breyer not only upheld conservative agency rulings more often
than either Justices Scalia or Thomas did liberal ones, but also had a
smaller liberal/conservative differential rate of 14.6%.
Another study by Professor Cross concluded that “[t]he
probability of conservative votes from a Justice using the plain meaning rule conforms pretty closely to [her] overall ideological preferences.”209 Yet another survey, by Professors Brudney and Ditslear—
this one involving the use of canons of interpretation as a means of
defining the interpretive context in cases presenting issues of workplace law—found that “the liberals and conservatives seem to have relied on both [statutory] language and substantive canons as support
for their pre-existing ideological preferences.”210
I do not mean to make too much of these studies. My claim that
textualism, like purposivism, requires value-based decisions at crucial
points in the interpretive process would stand even if critics refuted
the empirical claims that these studies’ authors make. For what it is
worth, however, the empirical literature suggests that judicial ideology
matters, to some extent, regardless of whether a judge is a textualist or
a purposivist. My aim has been to show how and why, wholly apart
204
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Difference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083
(2008).
205
Id. at 1154 tbl.20.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
See Eskridge, supra note 135, at 551.
209
Cross, supra note 51, at 1994.
210
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 51, at 58.
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from self-conscious judicial manipulation, the structure of both textualist and purposivist theories might permit that result.
III
CLARIFICATION AND DEFENSE
With Parts I and II having laid out my thesis about the significance of an interpreter’s values—in parallel fashion for textualist and
purposivist theories—in (1) triggering self-conscious interpretation in
cases of interpretive dissonance, (2) specifying the appropriate contexts for statutes’ interpretation, and (3) making determinations of
reasonableness within those contexts, I now want to clarify the limits
of my claims and to respond to a possible objection.
A. Some Limits and Qualifications
I have insisted, and now want to insist even more firmly, that my
arguments do not imply that either a purposivist’s or a textualist’s naked policy preferences will determine her interpretive judgment in
every case. Both new textualist and purposivist theories affirm that
statutory language matters crucially and that interpreters should never
reach an interpretive judgment that a statute’s language will not
bear.211 An example of the bite of this precept may come from a recent case in which the government contended that an exception to
the Freedom of Information Act for agency records “related solely to
internal personnel rules and practices” applied to data that the Navy
used in designing munitions storage facilities.212 However great the
Navy’s policy interests in resisting disclosure, a unanimous Court concluded that the statutory language simply would not bear the interpretation that the government sought to impose on it.213
To be sure, the Court’s conclusion must itself be seen in context.
First-blush meanings do not always prevail. Nevertheless, as I have
said, I assume that adherents of both textualist and purposivist theories typically work within relatively narrowly specified interpretive contexts, even when their resulting interpretive conclusions would
diverge from their pure policy preferences.214 In the study by
Eskridge and Baer cited earlier, the authors found that both conservative textualist and liberal purposivist Justices voted to affirm agency
rulings contrary to their presumed political values more often than
not.215 Nothing in Parts I and II suggests that interpreting statutes
211

See HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 1375; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 31.
Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262–63 (2011).
213
See id. at 1262 (holding that the language “does not stretch so far”).
214
See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing new purposivists’ preference
for a narrow interpretive context).
215
See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 204, at 1154 tbl.20.
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within either a purposivist or a textualist theory is like playing tennis
without a net. Rather, I imagine that both textualists and purposivists
apply their theories in a way that approximates what Fred Schauer has
called “presumptive positivism”—a theory holding that legal rules are
“presumptively controlling,” but a “rule will be set aside when the result it indicates is egregiously at odds with the result that is indicated
by [a] larger and more morally acceptable set of values.”216 Analogously, I assume that in the absence of severe interpretive dissonance,
both purposivists and textualists will normally adhere to statutes’
first-blush meanings or interpret statutes within relatively narrow interpretive contexts.
Nor have I argued that the choice between a purposivist and a
textualist approach to statutory interpretation has no consequences.217 Adherents of textualist theories normally deny themselves
the resource of legislative history as a ground for decision.218 In addition, conscientious textualists may bear a greater burden of specificity
than do purposivists in citing past or ongoing practices that should
inform the interpretation of statutes with jarring or improvident
first-blush meanings. Nonetheless, my analysis suggests that it would
be difficult to gauge in the abstract exactly how constraining either
purposivism or textualism is. Anyone seeking to predict case outcomes would also need to attend to the values and the remainder of
the judicial philosophies of particular purposivist or textualist judges
or Justices.
B. Meeting an Anticipated Objection
Even when my claims are carefully stated and qualified, they will
predictably provoke objections, especially from textualists. In particular, proponents of textualism—who have often characterized their
methodology as a buttress against value-based judicial decision making219—may contend that many of the judicial opinions on which I
have relied to show the ineradicable role of value judgments in statutory interpretation represent betrayals rather than applications of textualist premises. The foundational commitment of textualism, they
may argue, holds that judges must honor the legislature’s clear directives: although judges may look at context for aid in resolving statutory ambiguity or vagueness, they must not rely on context to call
216

SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 204–05.
But cf. sources cited supra note 51 (suggesting that ideology matters more than
methodology).
218
For a qualification, see supra note 125.
219
See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 16–18 (depicting purposivism as inviting
judges to rely on their own values and textualism as imposing more constraints).
217

R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt

728

unknown

Seq: 44

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

2-MAY-14

9:01

[Vol. 99:685

plain statutory meanings into question.220 And if avowedly textualist
Justices have recognized unwritten exceptions to the § 1983 cause of
action, for example, their willingness to do so does not establish that
textualism can support such results; it only shows that Justices who are
both conservative and textualist have sometimes unjustifiably subordinated their textualism to their conservatism.221
To separate the fallacy in this objection from the germs of truth
that it contains requires some unpacking. In identifying what new textualist and new purposivist methodologies require or permit, I have
relied on a strategy—which is common in the literature—of citing the
positions of self-proclaimed or widely acknowledged practitioners of
those methodologies.222 In particular, I have often treated the stances
of Justices Scalia and Thomas as exemplifying a new textualist approach. Although it would be aridly artificial to talk about theories of
statutory interpretation without reference to how their practitioners
apply them, my imagined objectors are right about an important
point: nothing guarantees that a self-proclaimed textualist will always
follow textualist principles. Betrayals are possible. Moreover, more
exacting versions of the current theories may emerge. As I have
noted, Professor Manning writes that textualists who followed their
principles to their logical conclusions would “treat[ ] the existing set
of background conventions as a closed set,”223 even though he does
not argue that textualists have done so. Adopting a similarly stringent
though more critical view, Professor Siegel argues that the “inexorable” logic of textualism is one of “radicalization” in which “textualist
purity must inevitably squeeze out the contrary pragmatic accommodations that textualism has traditionally allowed” and force the adoption even of “absurd” results.224
Although I disagree with Professor Siegel about the immanent
logic of the so-called new textualism, for reasons that I shall explain
presently, I do not doubt that some textualists would plausibly adhere
220
Cf. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 644 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court for assuming “a broad power to limit clear
text on the basis of apparent congressional purpose”); Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra
note 8, at 2421 (describing the “most familiar applications of strong intentionalism” as
those “decisions that adjust a clear statute on the basis of authoritative legislative history”);
id. at 2434 n.179 (“[T]he modern textualists’ concerns come into play only when courts
use background statutory purpose to contradict or vary the clear meaning of a specific
statutory provision.” (emphasis omitted)).
221
Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462 (2002) (maintaining that the conservatism of the
majority Justices of the Rehnquist Court sometimes trumped their commitment to judicial
federalism in statutory preemption cases).
222
See, e.g., Manning, supra note 6, at 438–39 (citing opinions of Justice Scalia and
Judge Easterbrook to exemplify texualist methodology).
223
Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2474.
224
Siegel, supra note 94, at 120–21.
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to more first-blush meanings, even when the consequences prove jarring, than Justices Scalia and Thomas characteristically have.225 But I
can cheerfully concede that point without retreating an inch from my
claims about the nature of the judgments that textualists need to
make once they recognize that the idea of plain meaning is frequently
chimerical and that actual statutory meaning always depends on context—as all so-called new textualists, according to Professor Manning’s
definition, avowedly do.226
Once this foundational commitment is accepted, the critics’ objection to my thesis in the blunt form in which I have stated it simply
crumbles. In the absence of further argument, unelaborated assertions that particular decisions ignore statutes’ clear directives are immediately unmasked as question-begging. As I have emphasized, the
need for express reliance on theories of statutory interpretation typically arises only when a plausible doubt exists—often following an experience of interpretive dissonance—about what exactly the
legislature directed.227 And once it is recognized that meaning depends on context, contestable judgments must be made about what
the relevant context includes.228 Then, after the relevant context is
identified, there again can be no doubt that textualists as much as
purposivists must make judgments of reasonableness that are also
contestable.
Against this background, claims that particular judges or Justices
have betrayed textualist principles in the cases that I have discussed in
this Article need to be established—if they can be established—on a
225
For example, some commentators have maintained that these two Justices have
frequently joined their colleagues in failing to abide by textualist commitments in many
statutory preemption cases, see, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 22 (2013), at least prior to Justice Thomas’s apparently nearly total renunciation
of implied preemption analysis in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“I can no longer assent to a doctrine that pre-empts state
laws merely because they stand as an obstacle to . . . the full purposes and objectives of
federal law . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Cf. John David
Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369, 427–38, 442 (2013)
(identifying implicit textualist assumptions about meaning in context that permit “a rapprochement between textualism and obstacle preemption”). For the argument that Justice
Thomas’s stance in implied preemption cases fits uneasily with his readiness to employ
broadly purposive analysis in interpreting preemption and savings clauses, see Catherine
M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling, Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence Thomas the
Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 63, 95–98 (2010).
226
See Manning, supra note 7, at 79–80.
227
Cf. Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 1559, 1585 (2010) (maintaining that “[t]o assert that a statute has a clear meaning . . .
is to claim that one particular interpretive frame . . . should be used” and that “ambiguity
very often results precisely from the fact that there is more than one frame of reference
with a decent claim to being relevant”).
228
Cf. Ohlendorf, supra note 225, at 439 (arguing that “textualism has the capacity to
take into account a rich set of contextual implications generated by a statutory text”).
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case-by-case basis. Absent such case-specific arguments, any blanket
assertion that all or even most of my doctrinal examples represent
betrayals of new textualist methodology should evoke deep skepticism.
Adrian Vermeule may exemplify a partial rejoinder to this argument, but one that lies mostly beyond the scope of my ambitions in
this Article. Vermeule proffers a normative, rather than a linguistic or
conceptual, argument in support of a particular, very narrow brand of
textualism.229 According to him, courts should “stick close to” what
he calls the “surface or apparent meaning”230— what I would call the
first-blush meaning—of statutes for “consequentialist” reasons,231
rather than for reasons inherent in the nature of language or the
meaning of “interpretation.” “Given the informational baseline of
clear and specific text,” he writes, “the further question” involves “the
marginal benefits of additional sources”232 in providing a richer context for determining what a statute actually means. In general, he argues, the costs of looking beyond first-blush or “surface” meanings
exceed the benefits because the acquisition of additional information
is burdensome and because courts may misapprehend its
significance.233
On the most natural interpretation of this argument, Professor
Vermeule accepts—as I have assumed throughout this Article—not
only that statutes have a “meaning” but also that a relatively broad
interpretive context might sometimes help to constitute it.234 If so, a
229

See VERMEULE, supra note 28, at 183–229.
Id. at 183.
231
Id. at 44.
232
Id. at 186.
233
See id. at 190–205. Vermeule’s argument is largely concerned with the costs and
benefits of inquiries into legislative history, but he also discusses, and disfavors reliance on,
both the canons of construction and “the collateral text of related statutes” that
“[t]extualists are prone to use.” Id. at 202–03.
234
Another possible interpretation of Vermeule’s argument also bears mention. Notwithstanding the language that I quoted above, some of his arguments might be understood as suggesting that statutory meaning is something that judges make, rather than find,
at least in the kinds of cases that trigger resort to interpretive theories. Taking this view,
Vermeule or others might maintain that the question of how judges should give meaning
to statutes when they intrinsically have none is a straightforward normative question. Cf.
id. at 198 (arguing that “judges should pick a clear and limited set of defaults and use them
inflexibly over time, rather than . . . indulging in case-specific, fine-grained adjustments of
the interpretive regime”). From that premise, someone might further argue that in exercising what is at bottom a lawmaking role, judges should, again for instrumental reasons,
adopt statutes’ first-blush meanings as the law. Although this is a possible version of a
theory that might plausibly be characterized as textualism, its bold insistence that statutory
meaning is a fiction, at least in cases subject to reasonable interpretive debate, marks it as a
position not easily squared with the more familiar textualist insistence that meaning depends on, but typically emerges to a reasonable interpreter in, context. See also RAZ, supra
note 142, at 238–40 (explaining that legal interpretation assumes the authority of the legal
text being interpreted and thus inherently includes “conservative” as well as “innovatory”
aspirations).
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statute’s meaning is what a reasonable interpreter of its language
would understand it to be in light of whatever features of linguistic
and historical context a reasonable person would deem relevant, potentially including, for example, traditional assumptions that statutes
do not apply extraterritorially, that Congress rarely interferes with the
states’ collection of taxes, and so forth. If so, Vermeule’s argument is
not about the defining premises of textualism as a theory of statutory
meaning. Instead, he offers a normative argument for restricting what
otherwise would count as textualist inquiries.
Others might offer similar, and similarly normative, arguments
for ignoring interpretive dissonance in some cases or for blinding
oneself to otherwise relevant elements of context, but the most important point that emerges from consideration of Vermeule’s position
would remain valid and generalizable: although sophisticated textualists acknowledge that they need normative arguments to support textualism over rival theories,235 they have not always recognized so
clearly that they also need to offer normative arguments to support
particular versions of textualism. If textualists assume that reasonable
interpreters ascertain the meaning of statutes in roughly the same way
that competent speakers of English identify the meaning of other
texts, the problem is that competent speakers of English ordinarily do
so in context by relying on and ascribing—often wholly
un-self-consciously—a number of what they reasonably assume to be
shared normative values. Accordingly, insofar as some textualists want
to preclude interpreters from relying on some bits of cultural or linguistic context, or on some values that a competent user of English
would otherwise assume to be widely shared (even if tacitly), they
need to advance specific normative arguments to support specific
exclusions.236
Among the implications of the need for specificity, one has special pertinence for claims that self-avowed textualists have betrayed
textualism, not applied it: there could be innumerable versions of
235
See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17 (“[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic
government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”); id. at
25 (“[T]o abandon textualism” is “to render democratically adopted texts mere springboards for judicial lawmaking.”); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 63–64 (arguing that textualism serves the objectives of giving the legal system “understandable commands, consistently
interpreted,” of confining judges to the role of “faithful agents, not independent principals,” of empowering Congress by “adhering [to] rather than shifting” from its selection of
rules or standards, and of constraining Congress from “[e]nacting a vaporous statute and
winking”).
236
Indeed, insofar as some of the substantive canons of statutory interpretation reflect
values that competent speakers of English would not otherwise take to be so widely shared
as to constitute relevant elements of a statute’s interpretive context, see Eskridge, supra note
135, at 552, then textualists who champion reliance on those canons would need to provide normative justification for that practice, too.
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textualism, each defined by its own proposed exclusions of particular
facts, values, or considerations that a reasonable speaker of English
might otherwise take to be relevant in trying to understand what a
legal text means in context. If successfully advanced, persuasive arguments for particular exclusions would support further arguments that
avowedly textualist judges and Justices have deviated from, rather than
applied, the best version of textualism. But establishing the requisite
foundation for claims of betrayal would require extensive intellectual
labor that I have not yet seen performed.
To sum up, regardless of whether particular decisions and even
doctrines are ultimately adjudged defensible, all textualists who agree
that meaning depends on context must also agree that first-blush
meanings are not always correct; that the contexts in which statutory
language has its meaning can be defined more or less broadly; and
that determining statutes’ meanings within their interpretive contexts
frequently requires judgments of reasonableness. Against the background of these shared premises, it would take either meticulous
case-by-case analysis or a normatively successful defense of a particular
subspecies of textualism to establish that the examples on which I
have relied in explicating textualism actually represent betrayals,
rather than applications, of textualist premises.
CONCLUSION
The key to understanding the subtlety and context dependency
of the interpretive enterprise lies in recognition that statutory interpretation, as an aspect of law, is necessarily a cooperative endeavor.
Courts must cooperate with the legislature, not frustrate or impede its
efforts. On the one hand, as sophisticated textualists have noted, if
courts define the context in which they interpret legislation too narrowly, they will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the legislature
to do its job effectively.237 Legislatures cannot realistically be asked to
replicate as much of the legal universe as they wish to retain, nor can
they be expected to specify precisely what they mean to change and
not to change, whenever they enact new laws.
On the other hand, if courts conceive the relevant contexts too
broadly, and thereby license themselves to determine what a reasonable legislator would have intended or a reasonable interpreter would
understand in light of too diverse an array of considerations, they
237
See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 355–63 (“Strict constructionism understood as a judicial straitjacket is a long-outmoded approach deriving from a mistrust of all
enacted law.”); Easterbrook, supra note 114 (explaining that “norms of interpretation . . .
make it easier to legislate” since “[n]ew statutes fit into the normal operation of the legal
system unless the political branches provide otherwise”).
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again make it impossible for the legislature to do its job.238 Courts
with a virtual license to interpret statutes to conform to their own standards of reasonableness would usurp the legislative function.
New textualist and purposivist theories of statutory interpretation
both constitute, and indeed present themselves as, responses to these
opposing pitfalls. To avoid these pitfalls, and to discharge their cooperative obligation, courts must identify pertinent interpretive contexts
neither too narrowly nor too broadly. Yet there is frequently no way
for courts to define a statute’s semantic or policy context without making value judgments, often beginning when a statute’s first-blush
meaning generates interpretive dissonance. And once an interpretive
context is broadened in response to felt interpretive dissonance, judgments of what reasonable legislators would intend or reasonable interpreters would infer will often require further, value-based assessments
of what is most normatively reasonable. Along these dimensions, new
textualist theories do not differ greatly from purposivist ones.
In maintaining that new textualists and purposivists face closely
analogous challenges in defining statutes’ interpretive contexts, and
that they cannot do so without making value judgments in some cases,
I do not question that the choice between a textualist and a
purposivist theory of interpretation will sometimes prove consequential for some interpreters. Nevertheless, for many practical purposes,
two other lines of division will often have more salience than the distinction between textualism and purposivism. One is value based: interpreters with different values will experience interpretive
dissonance, and begin to consider whether the interpretive context
should be broadened to include information that could potentially
justify rejection of a statute’s first-blush meaning, in different cases.
Another line of division involves the strength of the presumption that
interpretive contexts—whether they be semantic contexts or policy
contexts—should be defined narrowly.
When courts experience interpretive dissonance and must decide
how much additional information to take into account in specifying
the semantic or policy context within which a statute ought to be interpreted, all we can ask is that judges display good judgment—recognizing, as we do so, that what counts as good judgment will sometimes
be a matter of reasonable, value-based disagreement. In my estimation, the conclusion that statutes’ interpretive contexts could not be
specified formulaically in advance, and that judicial values will have a
238
See Manning, supra note 2, at 176 (“[U]nless interpreters give priority to the shared
semantic conventions that make it possible for legislators to communicate their policies to
the law’s implementers, a legislature cannot predictably use language as a tool to define
the scope and limits of the background legislative policies that the statutory text carries
into effect.”).
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role to play in fixing their bounds, is, on balance, more welcome than
disturbing. Nor do I regard it as disturbing that resort to theories of
statutory interpretation is often triggered in the first instance by a
judge’s partly value-based experience of interpretive dissonance between a statute’s first-blush meaning and what the judge regards as
sensible or desirable. In my view, it is nearly self-evident that good
judging requires good judgment, even when due allowance is made
for the fact that judgment will provoke value-based, reasonable disagreement in some cases.
But little hinges on the persuasiveness of this normative appraisal.
Whether one agrees or disagrees, the crucial analytical and empirical
points that I have sought to develop in this Article remain unmodified. The experience of partly value-based interpretive dissonance
often supplies the trigger for appeals to theories of statutory interpretation, including both textualist and purposivist theories. And within
both textualist and purposivist theories, the ultimate outcome will frequently depend on the breadth or narrowness with which the relevant
context for a statute’s interpretation is specified. To put the point
only slightly more strongly, the specification of an interpretive context—which is irreducibly value driven at least in part—may frequently matter as much, in practice, as the seemingly more
consequential decision whether to adopt a textualist or a purposivist
theory in the first place. Debates about theories of statutory interpretation will remain misleadingly incomplete until they reckon adequately with this insight.

